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Same-sex relationships will likely be in violation of the laws of most African countries.   
In Nigeria, Ghana and Kenya, a same-sex relationship is either explicitly prohibited or 
there is legislation which can be interpreted to prohibit the union. However, the growing 
trend of the institutionalization of same-sex marriage around the world means that even 
countries that do not domestically recognize same-sex relationships may be confronted 
with the challenge of dealing with it in a conflict of laws context. The discussion shows 
that the strict application of the rule of non-recognition, where the court gives no legal 
effect to a foreign same-sex union, is unworkable and lead to arbitrary and unfair results. 
African courts should use the incident approach to differentiate between cases where the 
parties seek adversarial court procedures, such as those dividing marital property, from 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1. Problem Overview 
 
There have been varied views on same-sex relationships in Africa. The debate has 
focused on whether particular states should or should not recognize same-sex 
relationships. While some view same-sex relationships as un-African, others believe such 
relationships existed among some indigenous African tribes. In countries such as Uganda, 
Ghana, Kenya and Zimbabwe, calls have been made for same-sex relationships to be 
explicitly banned. Indeed, the current trend of legislation and public abhorrence of 
homosexual activity does not reveal the acceptance of same-sex relationships in most 
African countries.1 
However, an important but often ignored aspect of the debate is how such 
relationships should be handled by the conflict of laws regimes in African countries. Will 
a same-sex marriage celebrated in Canada be recognized in Ghana? Will the children of a 
same-sex Nigerian couple who reside in UK be allowed to inherit their parent’s estate in 
Nigeria? Can an American same-sex couple adopt a child residing in Nigeria? The 
objective of this research is to find answers to the cross-border legal questions about 
same-sex relationships. Indeed, the nature of conflict of laws is such that even countries 
that do not formally allow institutionalization of same-sex relationships may be 
confronted with the challenge of dealing with it in a conflict of laws situation. 
                                                 
1 Recently, Nigeria and Uganda enacted anti-same-sex laws (see Nigeria: Same-sex Marriage (Prohibition) 
Act, 2014 and Uganda: The Anti-Homosexuality Act, 2014). President Yahya Jammeh of Gambia has also 
been quoted to have stated that his government “will fight these vermin called homosexuals or gays the 
same way we are fighting malaria-causing mosquitoes; if not more aggressively” (see Satang Nabaneh, 




Alongside the attempts to criminalize same-sex relationships, there have been 
some moves to positively acknowledge such unions. For example, in May 2012, 
Malawi’s new President, Joyce Banda, expressed her intention to scrap laws 
criminalizing homosexuality.2 In South Africa, civil unions in the form of marriage or 
civil partnerships are permitted by law.3 
Given the dearth of scholarship on this issue, this thesis aims to provide an 
authoritative treatment of the subject in Africa. Legislation and case-law in Africa have 
dealt with the conflict of laws aspects of same-sex relationships only in passing, if at all. 
The law in some African countries defines marriage as “the voluntary union of a man and 
a woman intended to last for their joint lives”.4 In many countries, marriage is not 
expressly defined by statute. However, it can be argued that on a true and proper 
interpretation of the relevant statutes, they envisage only relationships between a man and 
a woman. The definition of marriage as a union between a man and a woman dictates that 
same-sex relationships will not be recognized as marriage, and, accordingly, the parties to 
such a union would not be entitled to any of the benefits/obligations that come with 
marriage. The question is whether states that do not domestically recognize same-sex 
marriage will give effect to it in a conflict of laws sense when such unions are celebrated 
abroad. 
Contrary to the position taken in many African countries, in South Africa, civil 
unions solemnized either as a marriage or civil partnerships are recognized. In 2006, 
                                                 
2 “Malawi to Overturn Homosexual Ban, Joyce Banda Says”, BBC NEWS (May 18, 2012), Online:  
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18118350>. 
3Civil Unions Act,2006 (Act No. 17).  
4 See for examples, Sierra Leone: Matrimonial Causes Act,1950 s. 2; Kenya: The Matrimonial Causes Act, 
1941 (Chapter 152) s. 2; Tanzania: Law of Marriage Act, 1971 (No. 5) s. 9(1). 
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South Africa enacted the Civil Union Act, 2006, after a series of judicial decisions which 
challenged the non-recognition of same-sex relationships.5 The objective of the act is to 
regulate the solemnization and registration of civil unions, by way of either a marriage or 
a civil partnership, and to provide for the legal consequences of the solemnization and 
registration of civil unions. The act does not deal directly with the legal consequences of 
marriage. Article 13 of the act provides that the legal consequences of a marriage 
contemplated in the Marriage Act, 19616 apply with such changes as may be required by 
the context of a civil union. The Act also provides that, with the exception of the 
Marriage Act and Customary Marriages Act,1998,7 any reference to marriage in any 
other law includes a civil union, and husband, wife or spouse in any other law includes a 
civil union partner. 
The position in South Africa may be contrasted with that in Zambia, and that 
proposed in Nigeria. In Zambia, a marriage between persons of the same-sex is void. 
Under section 27(1)(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 20078 a marriage shall be void if 
the parties to the marriage are of the same-sex. This is perhaps the clearest prohibition on 
same-sex marriage in Africa. In 2014, a significant statute was also passed in Nigeria to 
prohibit same-sex marriage: the Same-sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act, 2014. The tenor of 
the act left no doubt as to the intention of its framers. Significantly, from a conflict of 
laws perspective, it deals with both the celebration and recognition of same-sex 
                                                 
5Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie 2006 (1) S.A. 524; National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v. 
The Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6; National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v. Minister of 
Home Affairs 2000 (2) S.A. 1. See generally Pierre De Vos, “A Judicial Revolution? The Court-Led 
Achievement of Same-Sex Marriage in South Africa” (2008) 4 Utrecht Law Review 161. 
6Act 25. 
7Act 120. 
8 No. 20 of 2007. 
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marriages. Under section 1 of the Act a marriage contract or civil union entered into 
between persons of the same-sex is prohibited. A marriage contract or civil union entered 
into between persons of the same-sex is invalid and illegal, and the parties shall not be 
recognized as entitled to the benefits of a valid marriage. Also a marriage contract or civil 
union entered into between persons of the same-sex by virtue of a certificate issued by a 
foreign country shall be void in Nigeria, and any benefits accruing by virtue of the 
certificate shall not be enforced by any court of law in Nigeria. Finally, under article 3 of 
the Act, only marriages contracted between a man and a woman shall be recognized as 
valid in Nigeria. 
The above reveals an unsettled state of law and contrasting approaches to the 
issue of the conflict of laws aspects of same-sex relationships in Africa. In light of the 
increasing pressures to accommodate such relationships, and the inevitability of the 
conflict of laws regime in Africa being invited to resolve issues involving them, this 
thesis addresses the following novel questions: 
 What has been the approach of African conflict of laws regimes to what, for want 
of a better phrase, may be described as non-traditional types of adult sexual 
relationships? 
 Which aspects of African conflict of laws regimes may be directly engaged by 
same-sex relationship issues and to what extent are the regimes ready to address 
those issues? 
 What has been the approach of Western conflict of laws systems, including those 
of Canada and the UK, to the conflict of laws aspects of same-sex relationships, 
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and are there any lessons African countries may find useful in the West’s 
approaches? 
The fact the same-sex relationship may be unrecognised and that conflict of laws 
issues associated with it may be unaddressed, can lead to many social ills. Conflict 
scholars are all too familiar with the problem of limping marriages. With the world 
gradually but surely moving towards accepting and institutionalizing same-sex 
relationships, the need to address all the attendant legal issues, including conflict of laws 
issues, is clearly of supreme importance. Canada and the United Kingdom are among the 
few countries that recognize same-sex marriage under legislation. In addition to the 
recognition of same-sex unions, these two countries have moved from the position of 
blanket non-recognition of other “odious foreign marriage”9 considered a violation of the 
UK’s and Canada’s laws, to granting recognition in specific instances. This thesis 
explores how the private international law issues generated by these unions are variously 
resolved, and the extent to which the approaches in these two countries may be useful to 
English-speaking African countries which are facing similar situations. Drawing on the 
jurisprudence in the two countries, this thesis argues that the approaches used in the UK 
and Canada to recognize certain foreign unions that are not allowed in their jurisdictions 
may be used when English-speaking African countries are faced with similar problems in 
relation to same-sex marriage.  
This thesis is organized into five chapters. This chapter provides the introduction. 
Chapter two focuses on the nature of marriage and other forms of adult relationship in 
                                                 
9See in general L. Lynn Hogue, “Examining a Strand of the Public Policy Exception with Constitutional 
Underpinnings: How the ‘Foreign Marriage Recognition Exception’ Affects the Interjurisdictional 
Recognition of Same-sex "Marriage" (2005) 38 Creighton Law Review 449 at 453. 
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English-speaking Africa. It explores what constitutes marriage in these countries and the 
various “deviations” from the traditional form of marriage (i.e. the union between one 
man and one woman) that are allowed, especially in legislation. Chapter two also 
identifies the common private international law issues that arise within the context of 
marriage and how they are commonly resolved in these countries. 
Chapter three explores how the private international law issues generated by 
same-sex marriage and other forms of foreign unions that are not domestically recognized 
in the United Kingdom and Canada are addressed in these two jurisdictions. Both are 
leading common law jurisdictions, and legislation and case law, especially from the UK, 
have very strong persuasive weight in English-speaking Africa. The goal is to explore the 
various ways in which the issues are resolved and the extent to which the approaches in 
the two countries may be useful to English-speaking African countries when they are 
faced with similar situations. 
Chapter four focuses on the English-speaking African countries that have little or 
no experience with same-sex marriage, in the sense that there is no legislation on the 
subject (e.g. Ghana), recent legislation on the subject (Nigeria), or contemplation of 
legislation on the subject. Using the analyses in chapter three as the context, this chapter 
explores how these countries can approach the various private international law issues 
that may come their way regarding same-sex marriage, irrespective of whether there is an 
express legislation on the subject. The chapter uses hypothetical case scenarios, proffers 
solutions to those scenarios and assesses the merits of those solutions. 
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Finally, Chapter five provides a conclusion. It argues that a rule of blanket non-























African countries are characterized by mixed legal systems. The sources of law in 
most English-speaking Africa countries are made up of domestic legislation and the 
English common law. Decisions of English courts thus have a real persuasive effect in 
most English-speaking African countries. The francophone countries are characterised 
with the codification system from French. Both systems reflect the influence of 
colonization of most of the African countries. In addition to this foreign influence, it is 
not surprising to find individuals in one country governed by a host of different personal 
laws.  This mixed system is particularly evident in regard to marriage. In most African 
countries marriage can be categorized into three types: statutory marriage (civil 
marriage), customary marriage and religious marriage. The co-existence of seemingly 
equal legal systems in one legal sphere provides the avenue for residents to contract 
marriage under any of these systems. However, the marriage must satisfy the 
requirements under the applicable law or custom for it to be valid. While the state 
regulates marriage in each jurisdiction, the extent of state involvement varies from one 
jurisdiction to another and from one form of marriage to another. Civil marriages are 
mostly celebrated under statutory laws, while customary marriages are celebrated and 
regulated under the custom and practices of each community. The co-existence of 




This chapter focuses on the nature of marriage and other forms of adult 
relationships in selected English-speaking African countries.10The focus of this chapter 
will be to discuss the different forms of marriage, namely, civil marriage, customary 
marriage and religious marriage, using specific examples chosen Anglophonic Africa. It 
explores what constitutes marriage in these countries and the various “deviations” from 
the traditional forms of marriage (i.e., the union between one man and one woman) that 
are allowed, especially under legislation. For example, in some of the countries under 
study, “woman-to-woman” marriage is allowed, whereas in other countries, same-sex 
marriage is prohibited. The scope of the union may also vary (e.g., cohabitation and 
common law partnerships). The chapter also identifies the common private international 
law issues which arise within the context of marriage and how they are commonly 
resolved in these countries.  
The chapter has 4 sections. Section 1 discusses the different forms of marriage in 
Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa. This section provides an overview of the 
institution of marriage as understood in the context of the countries under study. 
Essentially, the section explores the concept of marriage in the countries under study. 
Section two also provides how the conflict of laws issues relating to marriage are 
resolved in these jurisdictions. The section also identifies the internal and international 
conflict of laws issues which may arise from the co-existence of different marriage 
systems and how they are resolved. Given that woman-to-woman marriage is not 
common among the countries under study, the institution of woman-to-woman marriage 
and the conflict of laws issues relating to this is separately evaluated in section 3. Section 
                                                 
10 Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa, Uganda and Zambia. These countries are representative of all the 
regions in African south of the Sahara – west, east and south. Also, it is easy to access materials on these 
countries.   
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4 concludes that the approach adopted by English-speaking African countries to 
recognize certain marriages deviating from the traditional definition of marriage may be 
used to recognize foreign same-sex marriages. 
2. Types of Traditional Marriage 
2.1 Civil Marriage in Africa 
 
Civil marriages in Africa share a lot of similarities with the institution of marriage 
in jurisdictions like the United Kingdom and Canada.11 The definition of marriage in 
most English-speaking African countries is not different from that of the UK and Canada. 
In most legislation, marriage is considered the union of one man and one woman for life 
to the exclusion of all others. This is understandable, given that civil marriage is 
regulated under the received laws of most African countries. Common law in most 
Anglophone African countries comprises the doctrine of equity and judicial decisions 
from the UK. In addition, most English-speaking African countries have in place 
prohibited degrees of marriage legislation similar to that of the UK and Canada. The next 
section looks at the nature of marriage in English-speaking African countries in the 
context of civil marriage. Emphasis is placed on capacity and nature of marriage – gender 
of the parties, age, and the nature of the relationship between the prospective couples. 
 
 
                                                 
11 However, unlike the United Kingdom and Canada, civil marriage has not traditionally been viewed as 
what constitutes a marriage relationship in the countries under study. In Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, South 
Africa, Uganda and Zambia,   customary marriages have existed prior to the introduction of civil marriages. 
With the introduction of civil marriage, people can choose which legal system, the statutory or the 
customary law, that should apply to them. 
11 
 
2.1.1 Capacity and Nature of civil marriage 
2.1.1.1 Gender of parties and nature of marriage 
 
Civil marriages are strictly monogamous and, in most countries, they may only be 
contracted by opposite-sex couples. A civil marriage must comply with the appropriate 
legislation and the existing common law. While some countries define marriage in their 
legislation, in most cases marriage is not defined under family law statutes in Africa. In 
Kenya, “marriage” is defined as the voluntary union of one man and one woman for life 
to the exclusion of all others.12 Marriage is also defined via a heterosexual lens in 
Tanzania13 and other countries.14 Where marriage is not specifically defined, an analyses 
of the marriage formula in various statutes reveals that what is envisaged is a union 
between a man and a woman. In most Anglophone countries, pronouncement of a couple 
as man and wife is the marriage formula administered by marriage registration officers. 
In Ghana, after the solemnization of the marriage, the registrar of marriages is to address 
the parties as man and wife and the parties are to attest by signing their names as man and 
wife.15 This is also the position in Nigeria, where the parties are to be pronounced as 
husband and wife.16 In South Africa this marriage formula was challenged in the case of 
Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie.17 The court accepted the argument that the marriage 
formula envisaged is a union between a man and a woman and was thus discriminatory 
                                                 
12 Kenya: Matrimonial Causes Act,1941, s. 2. Section 2 of the Kenya Marriage Act also interprets “spouse” 
to mean a husband or wife. 
13  Tanzania’s Law of Marriage Act, 1971 defines marriage to mean the voluntary union of a man and a 
woman, intended to last for their joint lives. See in general Tanzania: The Law of Marriage Act, 1971, s 9. 
14 In Uganda marriage is not explicitly defined to mean a union between a man and a woman, however, the 
marriage formula under The Marriage Act contemplates a union between a “man and wife. See generally 
Uganda: The Marriage Act, 1904 (Chapter 251), ss 20-30. 
15 See Ghana: Marriage Ordinance, 1951(CAP 125) s 36. 
16 Nigeria: Marriage Act, 1990 (Chapter 218), s 27. 
17 2006 (1) SA 524. 
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against same-sex couples.  However, most Anglophone African countries have the 
common law definition of marriage in the context of civil marriage.18 
It must be mentioned that a man already involved in a customary marriage cannot 
conclude a civil marriage with another woman.19 So, where one party was already 
married under customary law, the High Court in Ghana held that the presumption of the 
continuance of the customary marriage was so strong that in the absence of any evidence 
in rebuttal, the purported civil marriage under the Ordinance was null and void and of no 
effect.20 In Nigeria, a civil marriage cannot be entered into where either of the parties 
thereto at the time of the celebration of the marriage is married under customary law to 
any person other than the person with whom the marriage is had.21 The first marriage 
must be dissolved before another civil marriage can be entered into.22 
However, it should be mentioned that parties are allowed to convert an existing 
customary marriage to a monogamous marriage.23 In one case in which the parties 
married in the Catholic Church before a marriage officer appointed under Ghana’s 
Marriage Ordinance and in the sight of witnesses, the court held that each and both of 
them, by that ceremony, changed their status as man and wife under customary law for 
that of husband and wife under the Marriage Ordinance, a completely new union which 
could confer obligations, rights, and privileges totally different from those under 
                                                 
18 In Hyde v. Hyde, (1866) LR 1 P&D 130 Lord Penzance emphasized the heterosexual character of 
marriage and also the fact that the union should be for one man and one woman to the exclusion of all 
others. 
19 However, in Kenya, the court of appeal in the case of Irene Njeri Macharia v. Magret Wairimu Jomo & 
Another, Civil Appeal No.134 of 1994 ruled that under the provisions of s.3 (5) of the Law of Succession 
Act, 1984 (CAP 160) a marriage under customary law will be recognized even if there was another 
monogamous marriage where polygamous marriage are allowed.  
20Genfi II v. Genfi II, [1964] GLR 548- 551. 
21 See, supra note 16, s 33. See also CAP 125, supra note 15, s 31. 
22 There is legislation which allows spouses of a customary marriage to convert their marriage into a civil 
marriage. 
23 See South Africa: Recognition of Customary Marriages Act, 1998 (Act 120) s 10. 
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customary law marriage.24 A successful conversion of a customary marriage to a 
monogamous marriage constitutes a renunciation of the rights, obligations and privileges 
under customary law and the parties cannot again claim the benefit of the provisions of 
customary law. However, there are no provisions regarding whether a civil marriage may 
be converted to customary marriage.25 The only avenue for the party wishing to marry 
under customary law after successfully contracting a civil marriage may be to divorce 




There are differences in terms of the ages at which parties may contract marriage. 
The age requirement differs from one jurisdiction to another.26 In Kenya, a person shall 
not marry unless that person is at least eighteen years old.27 In Ghana, the Marriage 
Ordinance, 195128 does not specify the marriageable age. However, for the purposes of 
the Ghana’s Children’s Act,29 a person below the age of eighteen is considered a child 30 
Also, consent may form part of the essential requirements of marriage where either party 
to the marriage is a minor. In some jurisdictions, consent from the parents of a child may 
                                                 
24Graham v. Graham, [1965] GLR 407-418. 
25 See at Gugulethu Nkosi “Indigenous African marriage and same-sex partnerships: Conflicts and 
controversies” (2007) 2:2 International Journal of African Renaissance Studies - Multi-, Inter- and 
Transdisciplinarity 203. 
26 Under the United Nations Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and 
Registration of Marriages, 1964, state parties are to specify a minimum age for marriage. However, the 
provision must completely eliminate child marriages and the betrothal of young girls before the age of 
puberty (see Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of 
Marriages, 1964, Article 2). 
27 Kenya: The Marriage Act, 2014 (Act No. 4) s 4. 
28 CAP 125. 
29 Ghana: The Children's Act, 1998 (Act 560). 
30Ibid, s 1. 
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be required where the child is below the marriageable age.31 Like the limitation on the 
age of marriage, the provisions on parental consent are instituted to protect minor 
children from early marriage. In Nigeria, if either party to an intended marriage is under 
twenty-one years of age, the written consent of the father and/or the mother must be 
produced and annexed to the affidavit before a license can be granted or a certificate 
issued for the marriage.32 The issue whether parental consent is necessary for the 
celebration of a valid statutory marriage in Nigeria arose in the case of Agbo v. Vudo.33 
The facts as reported were that 
[t]he plaintiff contracted a statutory marriage with his wife. He later 
petitioned the court for dissolution of the marriage on the ground of his 
wife’s adultery with a correspondent. The correspondent contended that 
the wife was minor at the time the marriage was celebrated, and that no 
valid marriage existed between the applicant and his wife, which the 
court might dissolve. It was held that notwithstanding the absence of 
parental consent the marriage was valid under S. 33 (3) of the Marriage 
Act.34 
 
It is, however, an offence for someone knowing that the written consent has not been 
obtained to marry or assist or procure any other person to marry a minor under the age of 
twenty-one years.35 In South Africa, a marriage may be dissolved on the ground of want 





                                                 
31 CAP 125, supra note 15, ss 27-29.  
32 See, supra note 16, s 18. 
33 (1947) 18 NLR 152. 
34 Intergovernmentalmarriagereg, The Legal Frame Work of the Statutory Marriage, online: 
<http://intergovernmentalmarriagereg.org/Nigeria/general/2-uncategorised/15-lectures-ref-2012tw-04>. 
35 See, supra note 16, s 48. 
36 South Africa: Marriage Act, 1961, s 24A. 
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2.1.1.3 The nature of the relationship between the prospective couples 
 
In some cases, persons falling within a certain category may be prevented from 
marrying each other. These persons are commonly said to fall within the prohibited 
degrees of affinity or consanguinity. This functions to limit intermarrying between two 
closely-related relatives. While some of these unions are limited for moral reasons, others 
have a scientific undertone. For example, it has been emphasized that multiplication of 
the same blood by in-and-in marrying incontestably leads in the aggregate to the physical 
and mental depravation of the offspring.37 Also, some of these limitations are meant to 
prevent sexual rivalry in the family and to protect the children, for whom this situation 
might be confusing and disturbing.38 
However, the degree of prohibition varies from country to country. In Kenya, a 
person cannot marry that person's grandparent, parent, child, grandchild, sister, brother, 
cousin, great aunt, great uncle, aunt, uncle, niece, nephew, great niece or great nephew.39 
In addition, a person cannot marry a person whom that person has adopted or by whom 
that person has been adopted. This seems to be the position in Nigeria where marriage of 
a man is prohibited if the woman is, or has been his ancestress, descendant, sister, 
father’s sister, mother’s sister, brother’s daughter, sister’s daughter, wife's mother, wife’s 
grandmother, wife’s daughter, son’s wife, etc.40 However, unlike Kenya, Nigeria makes 
provisions for two persons who are within the prohibited degrees of affinity to marry 
                                                 
37 See generally Ottenheimer Martin, Forbidden Relatives: The American Myth of Cousin Marriage 
(Illinois: University of Illinois, 1996). 
38 Jens M. Scherpe, “Should There Be Degrees in Prohibited Degrees?” (2006) 65:1 Cambridge Law 
Journal 32 at 33-34. 
39Supra note 27, s 10. 
40 See generally, Nigeria, Matrimonial Causes Act 1990, Schedule 1. 
16 
 
each other on an application to court.41 However, nowhere in Nigeria’sMatrimonial 
Causes Act is the phrase “exceptional circumstances” defined. It may be said that these 
are situations where the circumstances of the particular case are so exceptional as to 
justify the applicants marrying one another.42  Ghana has no specific rules on prohibited 
degrees but, in general, a marriage may not be lawfully celebrated which if celebrated in 
England, would be null and void on the ground of kindred or affinity.43 This essentially 
means that no person shall marry another person if they are related lineally, or as brother 
or sister or half-brother or half-sister, including by adoption. The position in Ghana 
requires some clarity. One question which may be asked is whether changes in the 
category of person under the prohibited degrees in the UK equally applies to Ghana? This 
is important given that in the UK, a marriage may now be solemnized between a man and 
a woman who is the daughter or grand-daughter of a former spouse of his (whether the 
former spouse is living or not) or who is the former spouse of his father or grandfather 
(whether his father or grandfather is living or not).44 
 
2.2 Customary Marriage 
 
Customary marriage in Africa varies widely between countries and between the 
many thousands of ethnic groups and cultures. Unlike statutory marriage, there seems to 
be no common standard in regard to the celebration and regulation of customary marriage 
in Africa. What may seem to be common in most Anglophone African countries is the 
recognition of the polygamous nature of customary marriages. In most jurisdictions 
                                                 
41Nigeria, Matrimonial Causes Act of 1990, s 4. However, in Kenya the marriage of a person with that 
person's cousin does not apply to persons who profess the Islamic faith (supra note 18, s 10(4)). 
42 Nigeria, Matrimonial Causes Act, 1990, s 4. 
43 See, supra note 15, s 42. 
44 See generally, UK, Marriage (Prohibited Degrees of Relationship) Act, c 16, 1986. 
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customary marriage has been defined to be potentially polygamous. The fact that a man 
married under customary law decides to stay only with one wife does not change the 
customary union into a monogamous marriage. In addition to polygamous marriage, there 
are other forms of customary unions in Africa. These unions have existed prior to the 
introduction of monogamous marriage in Africa. In this section, the different forms of 
customary marriage in Africa are considered.  
 
Polygamy may be defined as the state of marriage to two spouses. However, this 
definition is limited to the situation where a man is married to more than one wife at a 
time. Polygamy is prominent in many African countries.45A polygamous marriage serves 
as an opportunity to mobilize labor and, therefore, to establish a wealth-creating 
enterprise. Most religious marriages, like Islamic marriage, are polygamous in nature 
(and such unions are later considered under religious marriages). In most instances, 
customary marriage in Africa and polygamous marriage have been used interchangeably. 
It is not surprising to hear people referring to customary African marriage as polygamous 
marriage. It is, however, worth noting that polygamous marriage is an aspect of 
customary African marriage.   
In most English-speaking African countries, there seems to be an option for 
domiciled inhabitants to contract valid polygamous marriages where they are governed 
by customary law. Polygamous marriage under customary law is a lawful marriage 
recognized by the laws of Ghana.46 In Ghana, where a marriage has been contracted 
                                                 
45See James Fenske, “Africa Polygamy: Past and Present”, VOX 09 November, 2013 online: 
<http://www.voxeu.org/article/african-polygamy-past-and-present>. 
46 Ghana, Marriage Act, 1884-1985 (CAP 127). 
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under customary law, either party to the marriage or both parties may apply in writing to 
the Registrar of Marriages for the customary marriage to be registered.47 However, the 
registration of a customary marriage only gives it evidential value. In South Africa, it has 
been held that, non-registration or failure to register a valid customary marriage does not 
affect its validity.48 
Unlike civil marriages, the existence of a customary marriage is not a bar to the 
man marrying another woman. A man may enter into any number of marriages, provided 
that the subsequent marriage is otherwise valid. However, it seems that in South Africa, a 
man cannot just decide on his own to take a second wife without consulting the relevant 
stakeholders, including the wife concerned.49 This is to make sure that the first wife is not 
prejudiced by the arrangement. However, in Mayelane v Ngwenyama,50 the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa held that the consent of a first wife was not 
necessary for the validity of her husband’s subsequent customary marriage. 
 
One common type of customary marriage in Africa involves unions between close 
relatives. Some of these unions may fall under the prohibited degrees of marriage in most 
American and European countries. Marriage between relatives may also involve people 
already related from previous marriages. A man may marry his wife's brother's daughter 
(his niece-in-law). Although these unions are permitted in some African countries, the 
extent of recognition of some of these unions are not uniform. A marriage may be 
                                                 
47Ibid, s 2. 
48 See Kambule v Master of the High Court and Others, [2007] ZAECHC 2; [2007] 4 All SA 898. 
49Supra note 23, s 7(6) & (8). 




lawfully celebrated in Ghana between a man and the sister or niece of his deceased 
wife.51 In Nigeria, the marriage of a man is prohibited if the woman is, or has been his 
wife's mother, wife's grandmother, wife's daughter, wife's son's daughter, wife's 
daughter's daughter, sister mother's sister, father's sister, etc.52 In Kenya, it is prohibited 
for a person to marry that person's grandparent, parent, child, grandchild, sister, brother, 
cousin, great aunt, great uncle, aunt, uncle, niece, nephew, great niece or great nephew.53  
These prohibitions, however, relate to Christian or civil marriages, but the prohibition of 
the marriage of a person with that person's cousin does not apply to persons who profess 
the Islamic faith.54 
 
 
2.3 Common Law or Presumptive Marriages 
 
The concept of “presumption of marriage/ common law marriage” is not new in 
African customary law.55 Presumption marriages in Africa are not significantly different 
from the English common law marriage arising from cohabitation. The significant 
difference between the common law presumption of marriage as practiced in Africa is the 
capacity of the man to contract another marriage while the presumed marriage subsists. 
Unlike under the English common law marriage it is debatable whether a common law 
marriage as understood in Africa constitutes a bar for the man to enter into another 
                                                 
51CAP 127, supra note 46, s 42. 
52 See generally section 3 and the First Schedule to Nigeria’s Matrimonial Causes Act, 1990, for an 
exhaustive list of the Prohibited Degrees of Consanguinity and Affinity. 
53Supra note 27 s 10. 
54Ibid, s 10(4). 
55“Common law marriage” is used here as a euphemism for unmarried cohabitation. For a robust discussion 
on common law marriages as it existed under the English common law see in general Peter Stone, The 
Conflict of Laws (New York: Longman Publishing, 1995) at 46-49. 
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marriage with another person. Like many customary marriages, a presumptive marriage 
is potentially polygamous. The Kenya Court of Appeal has stated that  
before a presumption of marriage can arise a party needs to establish 
long cohabitation and acts of general repute; that long cohabitation is 
not mere friendship or that the woman is not a mere concubine but that 
the long cohabitation has crystallized into a marriage and it is safe to 
presume the existence of a marriage.56 
 
In essence, a stable permanent relationship between two persons of the opposite 
sex who had not been married to each other, but, nevertheless, lived a life akin to that of 
husband and wife is accorded the same status as marriage. In most of the countries under 
study, there are no specific laws regulating presumptive marriages. Common law 
marriages usually come up only in cases of inheritance when one of the parties has 
passed away and the other wants to partake in the estate or the termination of a 
relationship. To achieve this status, there must be evidence illustrating that the 
relationship is of a permanent nature. In a claim for succession in the case of Phylis Njoki 
Karanja & 2 others v Rosemary Mueni Karanja &another  the courts found that the 
deceased cohabitated with the respondent from 1984 to 1994; the relationship gave rise to 
one child; the respondent brought the two children whom she had given birth to with 
another man to the matrimonial home to which the deceased never objected; and other 
family members of the deceased, including his mother and brother, accepted the 
respondent as the deceased’s wife and recognized her as such both during the 
advertisement for and at the deceased’s burial. The court concluded that the evidence was 
enough for a marriage to be presumed between the deceased and the respondent.57 The 
court presumed the existence of a marriage due to lengthy cohabitation and circumstances 
                                                 




showing that although there was no formal marriage, the parties intended to live and act 
together as husband and wife.58  
 
 
2.4 Religious Marriage in Africa 
 
 While Muslim marriage59 and Hindu marriage are mostly considered under 
religious marriage, Christian marriage and traditional marriage have respectively been 
categorized under civil marriage and traditional marriage. A religious marriage must 
comply with the marriage requirements of the particular religion to be considered valid. 
In Ghana, a marriage by a Mohammedan, according to Mohammedan law, is at its very 
best a marriage by customary law, unless the marriage has been registered under the 
Ordinance.60  It is the registration of the marriage which confers statutory validity on the 
marriage. In South Africa, a Muslim marriage is invalid unless it is registered as a civil 
marriage under the provisions of the Marriage Act, 1961.61Until recently, South Africa 
held on to the position that Muslim marriages are contrary to public policy. In Ismael v. 
Ismael,62 the court held that Muslim marriage is contrary to the principles of public 
policy owing to the fact that it does not prohibit polygamy. This position is, however, 
debatable, given that customary marriage is potentially polygamous in South Africa.63 
                                                 
58 See also J M M M v EGM, [2014] eKLR. 
59 In Africa Muslim marriage is variously referred to as Islamic marriage, Mohammedan marriage, Muslim 
marriage etc. 
60 See Ghana, Marriage of Mohammedans Ordinance, Cap. 129 (1951 Rev.) ss 5, 10. See also Kwakye v. 
Tuba and Others, [1961] GLR 720-725, Brimah, Cobsold v. Asana, [1962] 1 GLR 118-120 and Barake v. 
Barake, [1993-94] 1 GLR 635—668. 
61 Act 25. 
62 1983 (1) SA 1006. 
63 See generally Amandus Reuter, Native Marriages in South Africa: According to Law and Custom 
(Münster [Ger.]: Aschendorff, 1963). 
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The Constitutional Court in the recent case of Daniels v Campbell NO and Others64 set 
aside the High Court order which declared that marriages by Muslim rites have not been 
recognized by South African courts as valid marriages because such marriages are 
potentially polygamous and hence contrary to public policy (whether or not the actual 
union is in fact monogamous). The Constitutional Court ruled that a spouse in an Islamic 
marriage was entitled to be regarded as a spouse for the purposes of intestate 
inheritance.65 
Kenya’s Constitution grants jurisdiction to the Kadhi court to determine questions 
of Muslim Law relating to personal status, marriage, divorce and inheritance in 
proceedings in which all parties profess the Muslim religion.66 In most jurisdictions, 
Mohammedan marriage is potentially polygamous.67 A man may marry more than one 
wife with or without the consent of the first wife.  
In terms of Hindu marriage, South African Hindu marriage is regulated under 
statutes. In Kenya, “Hindu” means a person who is a Hindu by religion in any form 
(including a Virashaiva, a Lingayat and a follower of the Brahmo, Prarthana or Arya 
Samaj) or a person who is a Buddhist of Indian origin, a Jain or a Sikh by religion.68 
Unlike Mohammedan marriage, the institution of Hindu marriage is not well developed 
in Africa. In South Africa, it has been stated that polygamy is the sole obstacle to the 
                                                 
64 2004 (5) SA 331. 
65Ibid. 
66Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 170. 
67 In Surah An Nisa: Ayah: 3 states that "If ye fear that ye shall not be able to deal justly with the orphans, 
marry women of your choice, Two or three or four; but if ye fear that ye shall not be able to deal justly 
(with them), then only one, or (a captive) that your right hands possess, that will be more suitable, to 
prevent you from doing injustice”. In Kenya, a marriage celebrated under customary law or Islamic law is 
presumed to be polygamous or potentially polygamous (see supra note 27, s 6(3)). 
68See, supra note 27, s 2. 
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recognition of Hindu marriages.69 The courts have stated that Hindu marriage is 
monogamous in character.70 
 
 
3. Conflict of laws Issues in Statutory, Customary, Common law and Religious 
Marriages 
 
It is trite that states have the right to determine what happens within their borders. 
This sovereign right includes matters relating to the legal recognition of marriages.71 In 
general, the conflict of laws approach to the recognition of marriage in Africa has been 
that in order for a foreign marriage to be recognized, the marriage must satisfy both the 
formal requirements of the place where the marriage was celebrated and the essential 
requirements of the laws of the domicile of the parties involved. Most Anglophone 
African countries apply the lex loci celebrationis to determine whether the marriage is 
formally valid, and the lex domicilii as to whether the parties had the capacity to marry 
under the laws of their respective pre-nuptial domicile.72 However, the application of the 
principle is subject to the public policy of the forum – policy in relation to age and degree 
of consanguinity, etc. 
In a claim for succession under Ghana’s Marriage Ordinance, the High Court in 
Ghana concluded that the marriage entered into between the applicant and the deceased 
was a customary marriage and not one under the Ordinance. Applying the lex loci 
                                                 
69 Lesale Mofokeng, Legal Pluralism in South Africa: Aspects of Africa Customary, Muslim and Hindu 
Family Law (Pretoria: Van Schaik, 2009) at 33. 
70 See in general, S v. Vengesamy, 1972 (4) SA 351; Seedat’s Executors v The Master (Natal), 1917 AD 
302.  
71 “Recognition of marriage” is used here in terms of one African country giving legal validity to the 
marriage entered into in another African country.  
72 See generally, Richard F. Oppong, Private international Law in Commonwealth Africa (Cambridge: 
University Press, 2013). 
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celebrationis, the court accepted the argument of the defendant that the forms and 
ceremonies for the marriage entered into, evidenced marriage under Togo customary 
law.73 In Nigeria, a foreign marriage is not valid if the purported marriage is not valid 
under the law of the place where the marriage has taken place.74  The provision places 
emphasis on the place where the marriage was solemnized. However, South Africa 
applies the lex loci celebrationis to determine both the essential and the formal 
requirements of marriage.75 In essence, the validity of a foreign marriage is determined 
under the place where the marriage was celebrated. In Chitima v. RAF,76 the High Court 
of South Africa held that the validity of a foreign marriage celebrated in Zimbabwe 
should be determined by Zimbabwean law. Oppong argues, however, that “this position 
is not free from doubt since there are cases which appear to suggest that the essential 
validity of marriage is regulated by domicile”.77 
Given that monogamous marriage is accepted by many African countries, there 
seems to be no contention as to the recognition of such marriages by any forum court. If 
parties had capacity to marry under their respective domiciles, the marriage would 
typically be recognized. Thus, a civil marriage, valid under the respective domiciles of 
the parties and the place of celebration will generally, be recognized as valid in most 
African countries.  
                                                 
73In Re Canfor (Decd.); Canfor v Kpodo, [1968] GLR 177-184. See also Davies v Randall and Another, 
[1962] 1 GLR 1-4. 
74 Nigeria: Matrimonial Causes Act, 1990, s 3(1)(c). 
75 Chitima v RAF, [2012] 2 All SA 632. 
76 [2012] 2 All SA 632. This principle is also applied in the recognition of civil partnerships from foreign 
countries. In AC v CS, 2011 2 SA 360 (WCC), the court applied the lex loci celebrationis to the recognition 
in South Africa of a civil partnership registered in the United Kingdom under the Civil Partnership Act, 
2004. 
77  Oppong, supra note 72 at 184. 
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There are, however, exceptions regarding marriages involving minors. Where the 
policy of the forum court prohibits marriage involving minors, the question arises 
whether such a marriage which was validly entered into in one country will be recognized 
in the forum country.78This situation may, however, be assessed on a case-by-case basis, 
and the court will take into account whether injustice will be caused if the marriage is not 
recognized.79 The court may also adopt the same approach in cases falling under consent.  
Another potential conflict of laws situation will be marriages falling under the 
prohibited degrees. It is debatable whether marriages falling under these prohibited 
degrees may be accorded recognition in other jurisdictions. In the context of civil 
marriage, most African countries follow the common law prohibition of marriage 
between relatives. Ghana family law policy prohibits marriage between a man, his sister, 
mother and daughter. Kenyan law prohibits any marriage between a person and that 
person’s grandparent, parent, child, grandchild, sister, brother, cousin, great aunt, great 
uncle, aunt, uncle, niece, nephew, great niece or great nephew.80 However, Nigeria 
allows some of these unions in limited circumstances.81 How will a Kenyan court treat a 
marriage between a man and his mother’s brother’s daughter? These and many other 
questions may be encountered under the plurality of the prohibited degrees in Africa.   It 
                                                 
78It has been mentioned that in most parts of northern Nigeria it is permissible for a man to marry a child as 
young as the age of 9 as long as sexual relations with her is postponed until she has attained puberty (see 
Ine Nnadi, “Early Marriage: A Gender-Based Violence and A Violation of Women's Human Rights in 
Nigeria” (2014) 7:3 Journal of Politics and Law 35 at 36. 
79In the English case of Alhaji Mohammed v Knott. (1969) 1 Q. B. 1 the High Court refused to recognize as 
valid a marriage celebrated between two Muslims in Nigeria on the grounds that the marriage was 
polygamous and the wife was below the age of marriage in England. On appeal, the Court of Queen’s 
Bench per Parker CJ ruled that the marriage would be recognised by the English court as a validmarriage 
giving the wife the status of wife. The court reasoned that the marriagewas a valid marriage according to 
Moslem law of the domicile. However, Murphy has argued that although the marriage of the 13-year-old in 
this case was recognized, it is clear from Parker CJ's judgment that the court reserved the right in other 
cases to refuse recognition. See John Murphy, “Rationality and Cultural Pluralism in the Non-recognition 
of Foreign Marriages” (2000) 49 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 643at 653. 
80 See, supra note 27, s 10. 
81 See, supra note 74, s 4. 
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may be stated that the non-recognition of these unions may still hold on grounds of public 
policy. However, the context of a particular case may shape the outcome for the courts to 
recognize some of these unions for specific purposes.82 
 
As discussed above, polygamy is recognized as an institution of marriage in many 
African countries. This makes the recognition of foreign polygamous marriage less 
contentious in Africa.83 In the context of conflict of laws, there is a favorable attitude 
towards polygamy in Africa. Many African countries domestically recognize polygamy 
as a form of marriage.  It seems where the marriage satisfies both the laws and customs of 
the jurisdiction where the marriage was celebrated, the marriage will be recognized as 
valid in the forum country. However, the forum court must be satisfied that the marriage 
has been validly contracted under the custom of a particular group. This is a matter of 
fact to be proved by the party relying on the existence of the marriage.84 
When considering whether the marriage has been validly contracted, the court 
may take into account issues such as prior consent of both spouses.85 This will usually be 
                                                 
82 In Cheni v Cheni the English court upheld the validity of a foreign marriage although the parties were 
under the prohibited degree of consanguinity-the wife being a niece of the husband. The court reasoned that 
the marriage was not so offensive to the conscience of the English court that it should refuse to recognize 
and give effect to the proper foreign law. To withhold recognition was to disregard the views of many 
civilised countries by whose laws these marriages are permissible (see in general Cheni v Cheni [1963] 2 
W.L.R 17). This consideration is instructive in deciding whether a valid foreign marriage should be given 
recognition. 
83 It is worth mentioning that historically a common law court had no jurisdiction to recognize polygamous 
marriages. See Sowa v Sowa, [1961] 1 All E.R. 687. In the South Africa case of Seedat v. The Master, 1917 
A.D. 302, it was held that South African law will not recognize a polygamous marriage for any purpose. 
The basis of the decision in Seedat's case was that it was contrary to public policy to recognize a 
polygamous marriage. But later cases showed a change in public policy in that regard and the courts came 
to realize that recognition of a polygamous union for some purposes is necessary. See also W. T. McClain, 
“Recognition of Polygamous and Potentially Polygamous Marriages and Conflict of Laws” (1962) 6:1 
Journal of African Law 54. 
84 In Ghana, for example, foreign law is a question of fact. See generally Evidence Decree, 1975 (NRCD 
323), s 1. 
85 The question of consent required in African customary marriage raises two distinct problems, namely the 
consent of the parents and that of the spouses themselves. This position is born from the conception that the 
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the case where the forum state’s public policy prohibits forced marriages. In Kenya, a 
decree of nullity of marriage may be made if the consent of either party has not been 
freely given.86 In such a case, notwithstanding that the marriage may have been validly 
contracted under the lex loci celebrationis, the court may nevertheless refuse recognition. 
In addition, the court may take into account the respective ages of the parties. This is to 
satisfy the court that neither party is a minor. This may, however, be contentious where 
the marriageable age of the forum state differs from that of the place where the marriage 
was celebrated. In this case, it is debatable whether the forum court can rely on its own 
laws to nullify a marriage sanctioned by another state. 
It can be concluded that given the prevalence and acceptance of polygamous 
unions in the legislation of most African states, the recognition of such unions across 
borders may not create any problem from a conflict of laws perspective. 
The question whether a court will recognize a marriage from another jurisdiction 
between relatives is not well settled in Africa. The reason may come from the differences 
in the relationships falling under the prohibited degrees in various countries. The 
existence of plurality in customary practices under prohibited degrees of marriage 
presents conflict of laws problems. This may be attributed to the fact that most statutes 
provide for the application of the customary law that prevails within the area of the 
jurisdiction of the court. In many towns in Ghana, for example, there are several systems 
of customary law which may be followed by members. This may give rise to internal 
                                                                                                                                                 
system of customary marriage in Africa is not just a union of ‘this man’ and ‘this woman’: it is a union of 
the family of ‘this man and ‘this woman’ (see generally Kwame Opoku, The Law Of Marriage In Ghana: A 
Study of Legal Pluralism the family of ‘this man and this woman’ . See generally Kwame Opoku, The Law 
of Marriage in Ghana: A Study of Legal Pluralism (Frankfurt: A. Metzner, 1976). See also Yaotey v Quaye, 
[1961] GLR 573-584. 
86 See, supra note 27, s 11(1)(e). 
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conflict of laws.87 Thus, a conflict of laws situation could even arise domestically 
between two communities in Ghana where the court may have applied the custom of one 
community to determine the validity of a marriage celebrated under that custom. While 
some states prohibit certain unions in their legislation, primarily for civil marriages, 
whether two parties can enter into a valid marriage under customary law is left to the 
customs and practices of the particular community. In South Africa, prohibition of a 
customary marriage between persons on account of their relationship by blood or affinity 
is determined by customary law.88The Customary Marriage and Divorce (Registration) 
Law, 198589 in Ghana also makes no provision for which relationships under the 
prohibited degrees cannot be registered under the Law.  The result is that, while certain 
unions are allowed in some countries, the same unions may be prohibited in another 
country. For instance, in some parts of Ghana, customary law allows a man to enter into a 
valid marriage with his wife’s sister, whereas such unions are prohibited in Kenya.  
 
Unlike places such as Canada and the United States, where presumptive 
marriage/cohabitation is well regulated under the family law system, the institution of 
cohabitation has not been given the needed attention in the countries under 
                                                 
87 Internal conflict of laws may arise in situations where there exists a plural regime in one legal system 
such that the country recognizes the operation of a variety of local personal laws.  In King & Another v. 
Elliot & Another, [1972] 1 GLR 54-59, the issue was which law should govern the succession to the 
deceased property; that is, whether Fanti customary law or some other law governed the question of 
succession. The court found that although the deceased spent some part of her life living in the Central 
Region she was not subject to the Fanti customary law. It was decided, accordingly, that the applicable law 
was not Fanti customary law but the English common law as it stood in 1874. The case illustrates the 
internal conflict of laws situation where individuals under one legal system may be subject to a different 
personal law. In such a case it is not only the laws of the country that applies to the person but the court 
also takes into account the different personal laws among the residents. Unlike internal conflict of laws, 
international conflict of laws mainly deals with issues across borders. In the case of succession, the 
question is which country’s legal system applies to the issue of succession.   
88 See generally, supra note 23. 
89 PNDCL 112. 
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study.90Whether a marriage can be presumed is a question of fact to be proven by the 
party asserting the existence of the marriage. This is because no registration occurs in the 
establishment of a common law marriage. The presumption does not depend on the law 
or system of marriage in a particular community. In essence, a party seeking to rely on a 
presumptive marriage will have to establish by the preponderance of evidence that such a 
marriage exists. This assumes constant cohabitation and a general reputation as spouses. 
From a conflict of laws perspective, it seems a court may recognize a presumptive 
marriage if such a marriage has been established by the court of the parties’ domicile and 
place of celebration. However, as with any other marriage, recognition of a common law 
marriage may be refused if the marriage is viewed as conflicting with strong public 
policy in the forum state.  As well, a marriage cannot be presumed in favor of any party 
in a relationship in which one of them is married under statute.91 Presumption marriages 
are mostly in cases where parties do not lack capacity to marry. 
As noted above, religious marriage is accepted in most African communities. The 
domestic recognition of this sort of marriage by most African states makes the conflict of 
laws aspect of religious marriages less contentious. A marriage valid under the particular 
religion in terms of formality and meeting the essential requirements will be recognized 
by the forum state. There is no apparent reason why religious marriages may not be 
recognized by a forum court. One issue that may, however, arise is where the forum state 
does not domestically recognize the polygamous nature of such marriage. In South 
Africa, for example, plural marriages formed under religious law (e.g., Hindu, Muslim) 
                                                 
90 See generally, Göran Lind, Common Law Marriage: A Legal Institution for Cohabitation (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008). 
91 In the Texas case of Guidry v. McZeal, [1986] 487 So.2d 780, the parties had visited and stayed 8 months 
in Texas. A common law marriage could not be established, as the man during the period of the stay was 
married to another woman. 
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are not accepted. However, considering the application of the conflict of laws rules in 
South Africa the courts are likely to give effect to the consequences of a religious 
marriage celebrated outside South Africa. 
 
4. Woman-to-woman marriage 
 
The institution of woman-to-woman marriage is not well acknowledged in Africa. 
However, it has been said that woman-to-woman marriage is widespread in African 
patrilineal societies, although the way it functions varies from society to society.92 In the 
context of same-sex marriage, “woman-to-woman marriage” deserves attention because 
of its semblance to lesbianism. This may suggest that same-sex union is,in actuality, not 
new in Africa. According to Katakami, woman-to-woman marriage refers to a woman 
who takes on the legal and social roles of husband and father by marrying another woman 
in accordance with the approved rules and ceremonies of her society.93In this type of 
marriage a female takes another female as her “wife”. She performs all the necessary 
customary rights and ceremonies associated with a valid marriage in her community and 
stands in the position of a husband to the wife. Woman-to-woman marriage may involve 
a surrogate female who takes the position of a male solely for the purposes of providing 
offspring for the male’s family. This is commonly used in kinship situations. The purpose 
of a union such as this is to provide a male heir.94 In describing the institution of woman-
to-woman marriage as it relates to the Nandi people of Kenya, Cotran emphasized that 
                                                 
92 See Regine Smith Oboler, “Is the Female Husband a Man? Woman/Woman Marriage among the Nandi 
of Kenya” (1980) 19:1 Ethnology 69. 
93 See generally Hidetoshi Katakami, “Female Husbands and the House-property Complex: Re-examination 
of the two guiding concepts in the literature on Woman-marriage”(1998) 1998:52 Journal of African 
Studies 51. 
94  Oboler, supra note 92. 
31 
 
a woman past the age of [among the Nandi and Kipsigis] child-bearing 
and who has no sons, may enter into a form of marriage with another 
woman. This may be done during the lifetime of her husband, but is 
more usual after his death. Marriage consideration is paid, as in regular 
marriage, and a man from the woman’s husband’s clan has sexual 
intercourse with the girl in respect of whom marriage consideration has 
been paid. Any children born to the girl are regarded as the children of 
the woman who paid marriage consideration and her husband.95 
 
 
A review of the various customary marriages indicates that woman-to-woman 
marriage is prominent in certain communities in Kenya. There, woman-to-woman 
marriage is predominant among the Nandi. It is also celebrated under Kikuyu customary 
marriage laws. It has been mentioned that among the Nandi, a female husband should 
always be a woman of advanced age who has failed to bear a son.96It has already been 
mentioned one essential purpose of the union is to provide an heir. In a claim for 
succession, the court found the existence of a woman-to-woman marriage between the 
petitioner and the deceased under the Nandi custom and, accordingly, held that the 
petitioner was a “wife”, and that by the operative customary law, she and her sons 
belonged to the household of the deceased, and were entitled to inheritance right, prior to 
anyone else.97 The court, in coming to this conclusion, was satisfied that the necessary 
conditions for the existence of a woman-to-woman marriage as it pertained in the Nandi 
custom was completed. 
                                                 
95 Eugene Cotran, The Law of Marriage and Divorce, vol 1 (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1968) at 117. 
96See generally, B. Oomen, “Traditional woman-to-woman marriages, and the Recognition of Customary 
Marriages Act” (2000) 63:2 Journal of Contemporary Roman-Dutch Law 274.  
97 In the Matter of the Estate of Cherotich Kimong’ony Kibserea (Deceased), Succession Cause No. 212 of 
2010 (High Court, Kenya, 2011). 
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The practice is also stated to be common among the Lovedu tribe in South 
Africa.98 However, unlike the institution of woman-to-woman marriage practice among 
the Nandi people, Krige has emphasized that the essential feature of woman-to-woman 
marriage among the Lovedu tribe is that the institution is not the privilege of those who 
have acquired wealth by their own efforts, but the institution is within the reach of any 
woman in certain fortuitous circumstance.99 In other words, woman-to-woman marriage 
is not practiced among only woman past the age of child bearing and who has no sons. 
Circumstances such the need to raise an heir for a political position, woman-to-woman 
marriage as an investment of wealth earned by women, arrangements in case of 
barrenness, and the queen's wives are some of the instances that may call for a woman-to-
woman marriage.100However, in many cases, the need for woman-to-woman marriage is 
for the wife to bear children for the female husband.101This is achieved by the barren 
woman marrying another woman for the husband. Cadigan has also mentioned that, the 
institution of woman-to-woman-to-woman marriage is a strategy that women use to 
further their social and economic position in the society.102 
In Nigeria, a court has ruled that where there is proof that a custom permits 
marriage of a woman to another woman, such custom must be regarded as repugnant by 
virtue of the proviso to the section 14(3) of the Evidence Act, and ought not to be upheld 
                                                 
98 See generally, Beth Greene, “The Institution of Woman-Marriage in Africa: A Cross-Cultural Analysis” 
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99 Eileen Jensen Krige, “Woman-Marriage, With Special Reference to the Lovedu-Its Significance for the 
Definition of Marriage” (1974) 44:1 Journal of the International African Institute 11 at 15. 
100Ibid at 17-21. 
101See in general, R. Jean Cadigan, “Woman-to-Woman Marriage: Practices and Benefits in Sub-Saharan 




by the court.103 The court used the woman-to-woman marriage here to refer to “woman-
to-woman” marriage analogous to lesbianism. However, in the opinion of the court, 
where a “woman-to-woman” marriage is not a marriage between two women, rather, one 
woman, due to the fact that she was barren, had procured another woman for her husband 
as a wife, such arrangement is not caught by the proviso to section 14(3), and is not 
contrary to public policy.104 
The position taken by the Nigerian court clearly differentiates woman-to-woman 
marriage, as practiced in some African countries, from lesbianism. It is apparent from the 
court’s decision that the absence of sexual satisfaction in woman-to woman marriage is a 
key consideration in holding the union valid. Where the union is akin to lesbianism the 
court may find such a relationship contrary to the system of jurisprudence practiced in 
most African countries.105In this case, the court accepted as a valid custom that if a 
woman has no issue she can marry another woman for her husband; any issue from the 
said married woman would be regarded as an issue from the woman who married her for 
the purpose of representation in respect of estates and inheritance.106 
Notwithstanding the foregoing account of woman-to-woman marriage under these 
customs, the institution of woman-to-woman marriage has not been given the attention it 
warrants and is still not entirely understood.107 It is arguable whether “foreigners” are 
entitled to enter into such a marriage. Essentially, the marriage must meet the 
                                                 
103Eugene Meribe v. Joshua C Egwu, [1976] 1 NLR [Part 1] 266.  
104Ibid. 
105 For a robust critique of this decision see C. O. Akpamgbo, “A ‘Woman to Woman’ Marriage and the 
Repugnancy Clause: A Case of Putting New Wine into Old Bottles” (1977) 9:14 The Journal of Legal 
Pluralism and Unofficial Law 87. 
106Ibid at 89. 
107  Krige, supra note 99. 
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requirements of the customs and practices of the particular community for it to be valid. 
In Eliud Maina Mwangi v Margaret Wanjiru Gachangi,108 the Court of Appeal in Nairobi 
overturned the decision of the High Court which held that the respondent was the wife of 
the deceased. In the opinion of the court, the marriage did not satisfy the essential 
requirements of the Kikuyu customary law under which the marriage was purported to 
have been celebrated. In Millicent Njeri Mbugua v Alice Wambui Wainaina, Hon. M.S.A. 
Makhandia, J observed that for a woman-to-woman marriage to be valid, the husband of 
the woman marrying another must have died; the woman marrying must have been left 
childless by her deceased husband; she must be past child bearing; the said woman or 
widow must pay ruracio to the family of the woman she is marrying; and she must 
subsequently arrange for a man from her deceased husband’s age group to have 
intercourse with her wife.109  
The concept of woman-to-woman marriage seems to suggest that the idea of 
same-sex marriage may not be entirely new, at least, to some African countries. Its 
semblance to lesbianism is well illustrated where a female takes another female as her 
“wife” and performs all the necessary customary rights and ceremonies associated with a 
valid marriage in her community. The significant difference maybe the absence of sexual 
relations for the two women concerned in woman-to-woman marriage. However, given 
the limited information on woman-to-woman marriage in Africa, its place in the 
customary marriage setting is uncertain. It appears to be limited to only certain tribes, so 
it is debatable whether a foreigner can enter into such a marriage, in Kenya, for example. 
It is, however, evident that the practice is recognized and accepted in jurisdictions like 
                                                 
108 [2013] eKLR. . 
109Millicent Njeri Mbugua v Alice Wambui Wainaina, [2008] e KLR. 
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South Africa and Kenya. The question is how these relationships will be recognized by 
other African countries. 
Supposing a Ghanaian goes through a woman-to-woman marriage with her 
partner in Kenya, what would be the Ghanaian courts’ reaction to such a union? Can a 
woman married under such a custom be charged with bigamy if, while the woman-to-
woman marriage subsists, she subsequently contracts another marriage in Ghana? Is one 
to accept that once the marriage is valid under Kenyan law, being the place of celebration 
of the marriage, then the marriage should be recognized? These may be difficult 
arguments to settle, given that Ghana does not explicitly bar woman-to-woman marriage. 
However, from a conflict of law perspective, it seems jurisdictions where such 
relationships are not domestically recognized may refuse recognition on grounds of 
public policy. That is, the marriage is not recognized by the lex fori. In Ghana, for 
example, marriage, whether customary marriage, civil, or Mohammedan, is viewed from 
a heterosexual perspective.110 It is debatable whether Ghana will apply the same conflict 
of laws rules, the lex loci celebrationis and the lex domicilii, to recognize a woman-to-
woman marriage celebrated in another country. In essence, a woman-to-woman marriage 
considered valid under the laws of the place where it was celebrated may still not be 
recognized in jurisdictions where woman-to-woman marriage is not domestically 
regulated. But where the non-recognition of such marriage will cause injustice, the court 
may base upon on public policy and natural justice to recognize it.111 
                                                 
110 See generally the Ghana’s CAP 127, supra note 46. 
111In re Kariyavoulas (Deceased); Donkor v. Greek Consul-General, [1973] 2 GLR 52. 
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It may be mentioned that jurisdictions like South Africa and Kenya112 may 
recognize such relationships from other countries, given that woman-to-woman marriage 
is domestically recognized under the customary laws of these states. This position 
explains that where a union is domestically recognized by the forum country, the courts 
are not reluctant to grant recognition to similar unions from other countries. However, a 
conflict of laws problem arises when the state within which a remedy is sought does not 




The institution of marriage in Africa is diversely practiced among the African countries. 
While the civil/statutory marriage is common among most English-speaking African 
countries and seems regulated along the English understanding of marriage, the extent of 
recognition and regulation of other domestic unions, such as marriage between relatives, 
Muslim marriage, polygamy and woman-to-woman marriage, differ from one country to 
another. This raises a private international law issue as to how such unions not 
domestically recognized in a host country will be treated in that jurisdiction. However, 
the fact that the marriage is between a man and a woman is critical and may be enough 
ground for the host country to recognize such unions where the essential and the formal 
requirements of the marriage are satisfied. As evident from the discussion, with the 
exception of woman-to-woman marriage which contemplates a union between two 
women, all other domestic unions have a heterosexual character and, accordingly, 
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envisage a relationship between a man and a woman. It is debatable whether the same 
recognition would be given to unions that are between the same genders. 
The next chapter examines how same-sex marriage and other domestic unions that are 
prohibited and not domestically recognized in Canada and the UK are treated from a 
conflict of law perspective. The discussion serves as the springboard and a comparative 
lens for examining how the conflict of laws aspects of such unions are or would be 



















CHAPTER THREE: THE CONFLICT OF LAWS ASPECTS OF NON-TRADITIONAL 




Canada and the United Kingdom are among the few countries that recognize 
same-sex marriage under their legislation. This is significant, given that studies have 
shown limited support for the recognition of such unions in many jurisdictions. In 
Canada, the Civil Marriage Act,113 grants legal status to same-sex couples who marry 
under the Act. The same can be said about UK. Its Marriage (Same-sex Couples) Act, 
2013,114 legalises same-sex marriage celebrated in the UK.  
Same-sex marriage in these two countries now has the same legal status as 
heterosexual marriage. This has placed same-sex and heterosexual couples in the same 
position in both jurisdictions. In addition to the recognition of same-sex unions, these two 
countries have moved from the position of blanket non-recognition of other “non-
traditional” forms of marriage to granting recognition in specific instances. Hitherto, both 
Canada and UK were characterised by a total rejection of the idea of polygamy and other 
relationships falling under the marriage prohibited degrees; a rejection based on the 
impossibility of such unions being considered as marriage in both jurisdictions. However, 
there is a growing benevolence of the English and Canadian courts toward the 
recognition of polygamous marriages and other forms of domestic unions. 
This chapter explores how private international law issues generated by same-sex 
marriage and other ‘non-traditional’ foreign marriages are addressed in UK and Canada. 
Both countries are common law jurisdictions, and legislation and case law, especially in 
                                                 
113 SC 2005 (c 33). 
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the UK, have very strong persuasive weight in English-speaking African countries. The 
goal is to examine how the private international law issues generated by these unions are 
resolved, the various ways of resolving them and the extent to which the approaches in 
these two countries may be useful to English-speaking African countries which are facing 
similar situations. 
The chapter is divided into 3 sections. Section 1 examines the recognition of non-
traditional forms of marriage in UK and Canada before the Marriage (Same-sex Couples) 
Act and Civil Marriage Act. This will provide a general overview of what had hitherto 
been the definition of marriage in these two jurisdictions and how the courts have dealt 
with the recognition of foreign unions that are not domestically recognized in the two 
countries. Section 2 and 3, respectively, examines the approaches adopted by Canada and 
UK to resolve the conflict of laws issues which arise from same-sex marriage. This will 
form a basis for the recommendations of approaches that may be useful to English-
speaking African countries where same-sex marriage is not legally recognized. 
 
2. Recognition of “Non Traditional Marriage” in Canada and UK: A Conflict 
of Laws Perspective 
 
The institution of marriage is fundamental to the legal system of many countries. 
In Canada, legislative jurisdiction over marriage and divorce is shared by the federal and 
the provincial government. This is different from the practice in the United Kingdom 
where legislative authority over contracting and the incidents of marriage is unitarily 
regulated by the central government. In Canada, section 91(22) of the Constitution Act, 
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1867115 vests exclusive right in the Parliament of Canada in all matters relating to 
marriage and divorce. The provinces have legislative jurisdiction over the solemnisation 
of marriage.116 This distribution means that the essential requirements of marriage 
relating to capacity to marry is in the domain of the federal government, while matters 
considered under the formal requirements are regulated under provincial legislation.117 
However, while provincial governments cannot legislate on capacity, the courts have 
interpreted the provincial solemnisation jurisdiction to include regulating the minimum 
age for the issuance of a marriage license or solemnisation in the provinces.118 In 
circumstances where there is conflict between valid federal and valid provincial 
legislation, the principle has been that federal legislation takes priority and supersedes 
provincial legislation.119 But in the area of divorce, federal legislation has been applied 
uniformly throughout the country.120 In addition, the courts have extended the federal 
divorce power to include child, spousal support and custody issues ancillary to divorce.121 
In the UK, marriage is unitarily regulated under the general laws of the country. 
That is, both the essential and formal requirements of marriage are regulated under the a 
unitary system. Before the enactment of the Civil Marriage Act and the Marriage (Same-
sex Couples) Act, both Canada and UK considered marriage as the voluntary union for 
life of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others.122 This was in tandem with 
                                                 
115 30 & 31 Vict, c 3. 
116Ibid, s 92(12). 
117 See generally Vaughan Black, “Choice of Law and Territorial Jurisdiction of Courts in Family Matters” 
(2013) 32 Canadian Fam. L.Q.53. 
118See Hobson v Gray, [1958] 25 W.W.R 82.  
119 However, In Re Marriage Legislation in Canada, 1912 A.C 880, the Privy Council expressed the 
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and that federal legislation cannot override valid provincial legislation. 
120 See generally the Divorce Act, RSC 1985, c 3. 
121 Matrimonial property is governed by provincial legislation. 
122 “Spouse” was defined to mean one of the opposite sex. 
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the common law definition of marriage given in Hyde v. Hyde.123 In this case, Lord 
Penzance emphasized the heterosexual character of marriage and also the fact that any 
institution that acts contrary to the “one man, one woman” rule was in fact not a marriage 
in the Christian sense. In both Canada and UK, this preposition has been applied to 
domestic marriages and also to the recognition of foreign marriages.124 
It is trite that states have the right to determine what will happen within their 
borders. This sovereign right includes matters relating to the legal recognition of 
marriages. The validity of marriages celebrated in a country is determined under the laws 
of that country, including its private international law. In general, recognition of marriage 
celebrated domestically by individuals domiciled in the forum country are rarely matters 
of contention before domestic courts. The marriage must meet both the formal and 
essential requirements of the family law of the particular state for it to be valid.125 In both 
Canada and the UK, domestic relationships, like polygamy, incest and relationships 
falling under the prohibited degrees, have long been prohibited126 under various rules, 
and any purported marriage in violation of these prohibitions was considered void and of 
no legal effect.   
Although there seems to be no contention in regard to the validity of marriages 
which are domestically celebrated, the case is different with recognition of foreign 
                                                 
123 (1866) LR 1 P&D 130. 
124 See generally Lim v Lim, [1948] 2 DLR 353, 1 WWR 298; Sara v Sara,[1962], 31 DLR (2d) 566, 38 
WWR 143;Peters v Murray, [2006] OJ No 4871, 153 ACWS (3d) 913. 
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marriages. In this case the courts give effects to status or legal obligations created by a 
foreign marriage.  In general, the conflict of laws approach to the recognition of marriage 
in both Canada and the UK have been that in order for a foreign marriage to be 
recognized, the marriage must satisfy both the formal requirement of the place where the 
marriage was celebrated, and the essential requirement of the laws of the domicile of the 
parties involved.127 The lex loci celebrationis is applied to determine whether the 
marriage is formally valid, and the lex domicilii is applied to determine whether the 
parties had the capacity to marry under the laws of their respective pre-nuptial domicile. 
In essence, a marriage valid under the respective domiciles of the parties and the place of 
celebration will be recognized as valid in the forum country. However, strict application 
of the rule has mainly been in respect to marriages falling under the traditional definition 
of marriage set out in Hyde v. Hyde, namely, that in addition to the marriage meeting the 
essential and formal requirements of the respective pre-nuptial domicile of the respective 
parties, it must be between a man and a woman and must be monogamous. In addition, 
the marriage must not fall within any of the degrees of consanguinity and affinity 
prohibiting marriage. 
In both Canada and UK, different approaches were used when the marriage under 




                                                 
127 In the US, the formal and essential validity of marriage are both determined under the laws of the lex 
loci celebrationis. 
128 For Canada, see, for example, Azam v. Jan 2013 ABQB 301. 
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2.1 Canada’s Approach to the Recognition of Non-Traditional Marriage 
 
Canada has historically adopted different approaches towards the recognition of 
non-traditional marriages. Canadian courts, for instance, routinely applied the lex loci 
celebrationis and the lex domicilii to traditional marriages of one man and one woman. 
However, they were reluctant to adopt the same approach in to recognize polygamous 
marriages,129 that is, Canadian courts refused to recognise a polygamous marriage even 
when it had been validly contracted under both the lex loci celebrationis and the lex 
domicilii rules.130 In Lim v Lim,131 a Chinese domiciled in China entered into a 
polygamous marriage with two women. The marriage was legal under Chinese law. The 
man subsequently immigrated with the second wife to Canada. In an application for 
maintenance by the second wife upon the husband’s desertion, the court declined 
jurisdiction on the basis that neither party in a polygamous marriage was entitled to a 
relief from a Canadian court. Essentially, the marriage was not recognized by the laws of 
Canada.132 
It is debatable whether Lim v Lim was a good decision even at the time it was 
made. Before that decision, the British Columbia court in Yew v Attorney General of 
British Columbia133 had, on similar facts, recognized two wives of polygamous marriages 
as wives for all purposes of the Succession Duty Act. Although  Coady J. in Lim referred 
to Yew, he recognized that the Yew case only accepted that it was the status enjoyed by 
both wives of the deceased resident in China that’s must be recognized by the British 
                                                 
129 Amy J. Kaufman, “Polygamous marriages in Canada” (2005) 21 Canadian Journal of Family Law 215 at 
320. 
130 See, in general, Tse v Minister of Employment & Immigration, [1983] 2 F.C. 308; and Ali v Canada 
Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [1998] F.C.J No 468. 
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Columbia Courts in the disposition of his estate. However, the judge concluded that he 
was bound by Hyde v Hyde and, accordingly, refused to recognize the marriage. It is 
evident the unjust result that flowed when the rule in Hyde v Hyde is followed in all its 
strictness. Essentially, the wife to a foreign marriage is refused the right to enforce a 
remedy to which, under Canadian law a wife is entitled by reason of the marriage 
contract.134 
The legislative attitude was not only to proscribe polygamous marriage but to 
make it a crime for any person who enters into it. Although the criminal sanction applies 
to individuals domiciled in Canada, it made it difficult for the court to recognize as valid 
a foreign union which is criminalized in the jurisdiction.135 
The rule of blanket non-recognition was criticized, but the non-recognition of 
such marriages was defended on public policy grounds, and also on the grounds that such 
marriages were not recognized according to the lex fori.136 Essentially, such marriages 
would not have been valid if celebrated in Canada. This led to the limping marriage 
phenomenon where marriages validly accepted in the parties’ domicile were not 
recognized as valid in Canada, leaving a party with no relief.137 Blanket non-recognition 
                                                 
134 See Re Hassan and Hassan, [1976] 12 OR (2d) 432;69 DLR (3d) 224;28 RFL 121. 
135 See Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 293.  The British Columbia Supreme Court has ruled that the 
ban on polygamy does not violate the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Reference re: Section 293 of the 
Criminal Code of Canada, [2011] BCSC 1588). Also the Alberta Court of Appeal stated in Nafie v 
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Accordingly, even if the marriage is valid where celebrated, Alberta may not recognise it as valid. 
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on Charter grounds; making the courts rely on the public policy approach to refuse recognition. The 
argument put forward to refuse recognition is that polygamous marriages maintain and deepings inequality 
between sexes. In short, polygamy is seen as an institution that discriminates against women (see generally 
Kaufman, supra note 129). 
137 The non-recognition of polygamous marriages had the effect on immigration officers refusing 
applicants’ entry to Canada on the suspicion that an applicant will practice polygamy in Canada (see Ali v 
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), supra note 130). 
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of other domestic unions like incest was also defended on the same public policy 
grounds.  
 
2.2 UK’s Approach to the Recognition of Non-Traditional Marriage 
 
UK has long refused recognition of foreign domestic unions falling outside the 
definition of marriage established in Hyde. Subsequent to Hyde, the English court in Re 
Bethell138 refused to recognize a marriage celebrated in South Africa under the Baralong 
custom between a man domiciled in the UK and a member of the Baralong tribe. 
Baralong custom allows polygamy. The traditional conflict of laws position in English 
law was that a marriage that is good by the law of one country must be held good in all 
others where the question of its validity arises. However, this position was applicable 
only to marriages falling under the rule in Hyde v Hyde.139 In Re Bethell, it was reasoned 
no marriage existed and the rule could not be applied. In essence, the court gave effect to 
the preposition by Lord Penzance in Hyde that the union was in fact not a marriage in the 
Christian sense and, therefore, refused to recognise it.140 
 
The judgment in Re Bethell represents the distinction between Christian marriage 
and other unions. In essence, the status created by the union was not the status of a 
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139Ibid, at 233. See also C.A. Esplugues, “Legal Recognition of Polygamous Marriages” (1984), 17 Comp. 
Int’l L. J. S. Afr. 302 at 304. 
140 UK policy on non-traditional marriages is also evident in the country’s immigration rules. The UK has 
long refused to issue immigration visas to women who are in actual polygamous relationships (see R v 
Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Hasna Begum, [1995] Imm AR 249; R v Secretary of State for the 
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married person not a husband or wife. Although the decision may be criticised for the fact 
that it failed to recognize a status validly conferred on the parties by a foreign law, a strict 
application of the lex domicile rule supports the court’s decision. Under English law, the 
man did not have the capacity to enter into the polygamous marriage.  
 
In matrimonial cases, the English courts declined jurisdiction to dissolve even a 
potentially polygamous marriage where the parties were subject to foreign law. In Sowa 
v. Sowa,141 the court declined jurisdiction in a suit for separation and maintenance. Before 
assuming jurisdiction in any matrimonial case the first issue for consideration was 
whether the marriage falls under the principles established in Hyde v. Hyde.142 In Sowa, 
the court declined to consider whether the husband had a duty to maintain his "wife" and 
infant child on the basis that the marriage was celebrated under a polygamous law in 
Ghana. In essence, the court viewed the issue of maintenance of the dependents as 
necessarily geared to and dependent on jurisdiction in matrimonial causes. 
 
2.3 Trend towards the recognition of non-traditional marriages in Canada and 
UK 
 
The position of non-recognition of certain marriages in both the UK and Canada 
resulted in unfair and unjust outcome. In some cases, a spouse to a foreign marriage is 
left without a remedy and may be tied to a relationship which existed only by name. 
However, later judicial decisions in both jurisdictions gave indication that the previous 
position of total non-recognition of certain marriages may be less strictly applied. The 
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attitude towards polygamy changed considerably. The courts abandoned the strict 
application of the monogamous character of marriage and recognised several effects of 
such marriages. The context of each case started to profoundly shape the outcome. In 
Radwan v. Radwan(No.2)143 Cumming-Bruce J emphasized that 
 
[I]t is an over-simplification of the common law to assume that the 
same test … applies to every kind of incapacity, non-age, affinity, 
prohibition of monogamous contract by virtue of an existing spouse 
and the capacity for polygamy. Different public and social factors are 
relevant to each of these.144 
 
Each case was treated on its own merits. In this regard, spouses who had 
lawfully contracted a foreign marriage in accordance with their personal law had 
the marriage recognized for specific purposes.  
 
In Cheni v. Cheni,145 the court assumed jurisdiction in a marriage celebrated in 
Egypt that was not recognized under English domestic law. The parties were within the 
prohibited degree of consanguinity-the wife being a niece of the husband. The English 
court assumed jurisdiction and upheld the validity of the marriage, though it was against 
English policy. In the opinion of Sir Jocelyn Simon, P, the true test in withholding 
recognition on the ground of public policy was “whether the marriage is so offensive to 
the conscience of the English court that it should refuse to recognize and give effect to 
the proper foreign law. In deciding that question, the court will seek to exercise common 
sense, good manners, and reasonable tolerance".146 To withhold recognition was to 
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disregard the views of many civilised countries by whose laws these marriages are 
permissible. These considerations are instructive in deciding whether a valid foreign 
marriage should be given recognition. It is also worth mentioning that, from the facts of 
the case, the marriage at the time of the suit had become monogamous, and accordingly, 
favored the court to assume jurisdiction. The court recognized that the acquisition of an 
English domicile of choice changed the character of a potentially polygamous marriage 
and gave the English Courts jurisdiction. This differentiated it from Sowa where the 
parties’ potential polygamous marriage still subsisted at the time the relief was sought.147 
 
The concept of change in domicile and the acquisition of a new status have been 
applied in a number of cases where it is evident that a party is relying on the polygamous 
status to defeat a claim. In Haussain v Haussain,148 the husband tried to rely on the 
polygamous nature of his marriage to defeat the wife’s claim for a decree of judicial 
separation. He denied that he was married under English law since her marriage was 
potentially polygamous under Pakistan law – the place of celebration of the marriage. 
The Court, however, found that the acquisition of English domiciliary changed the 
marriage into a monogamous one.  
 
A review of the cases illustrates some degree of inconsistency in the decisions of 
the courts. This is because the courts seem to apply different conflict of laws rules in the 
recognition/non-recognition of foreign marriages. In one breath, the court seems to rely 
on the pre-nuptial domicile of the parties to assume jurisdiction, while in another, the 
                                                 
147 See generally P. R. H. Webb, “Potentially Polygamous Marriages and Capacity to Marry (Based on 
Cheni (Orse. Rodriguez) v. Cheni)” (1963) 12:2 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 672. 
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court declines jurisdiction on the basis that the marriage was potentially polygamous 
under the laws of the place of celebration. This created uncertainty as to when an English 
court may recognize a foreign marriage falling outside the traditional definition of 
marriage. 
 
The cases above illustrate a departure by English courts towards a benevolent 
approach to the recognition of other forms of union that were not domestically 
recognized in the UK. It is not certain what accounted for the change in judicial attitude 
except for Esplugues’s view that the shift in attitude was justified by the important 
process of migration in England.149 He also mentioned that receptivity to polygamy was a 
consequence of the same alteration in the concepts of morality that society shares, and the 
modification of the role that family and marriage play in it.150 Essentially, there was a 
change in attitude as to what traditionally have been considered marriage under English 
law. In Esplugues’s opinion, it was not possible to deny recognition to polygamous 
marriages when "de facto unions" were allowed effect for certain purposes.151 It is also 
evident from the cases that the English courts departed from blanket non-recognition of 
certain domestic unions towards the characterization of such unions. The subtle 
distinction between matrimonial causes and other matters enabled the court, to decide 
whether to grant relief in particular cases. This does not mean that these prohibited 
unions have become legally respectable in England. It is simply that the courts extend 
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polygamous marriages when "de facto unions" were allowed effects for certain purposes. See Esplugues, 
supra note 27 at 306. 
150Supra note 27. 
151Supra note 27at 306. 
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recognition to deal with specific claims involved.152 Essentially, the courts distinguished 
between the validity of a marriage and its effects. This way, they were able to give effect 
to incidents of some domestic unions which were not domestically recognized, although 
the recognition did not modify the monogamous character of marriage in England. 
 
It is also worth mentioning that before the decision in Haussain, parliament had 
granted jurisdiction to English courts to adjudicate cases of polygamy, putting to rest the 
issue whether an English court could exercise jurisdiction in a polygamous marriage. 
This was regulated under the Matrimonial Proceedings (Polygamous Marriages) Act, 
1972.153 Under the Act, a court in England was not to be precluded from granting 
matrimonial relief or making a declaration concerning the validity of a marriage by 
reason that the marriage in question was entered into under a law which permits 
polygamy.154 Essentially, the Act permitted courts in the United Kingdom to grant 
matrimonial relief in respect to polygamous marriages.155 The Act, however, did not 
grant recognition to domestic polygamous relationships celebrated in the UK.156  A party 
domiciled in the UK cannot enter into a polygamous marriage even if the marriage is 
contracted outside. Such marriage is void and has no legal effect in the UK. Thus, UK 
domiciliaries could not take advantage of the Act to contract a valid polygamous 
marriage outside the UK. Essentially, the Act represented legislative benevolence 
towards the recognition of polygamous marriages celebrated by foreign individuals. 
                                                 
152 In a different but related context, see Andrews Koppleman, Same-sex, Different States: When Same-Sex 
Marriages Cross State Lines (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006). 
153 Repealed by Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973 (c 18) s 54(1) Schedule 3. 
154Matrimonial Proceedings (Polygamous Marriages) Act, 1972, s 2. 
155Ibid, s 4. 
156 The Matrimonial Proceedings (Polygamous Marriages) Act is still part of the laws of the UK with only 




From a conflict of laws perspective, the approach to the recognition of foreign 
domestic unions in the UK is not significantly different from that of Canada. However, in 
Canada, the courts, compared with Parliament, seem to be more benevolent to the 
recognition of polygamy.157 The courts look into the facts of each case to ascertain 
whether a particular remedy should be applied.158 
 
At present, Canada seems to apply the same recognition test for traditional 
marriages as for non-traditional foreign marriages. If parties had the capacity to marry 
under their respective domiciles, the marriage would typically be recognized in Canada 
even if the celebration of such a marriage would not be permitted in Canada.159 A 
polygamous marriage valid under both the lex loci celebrations and the lex domicilii 
principles will be recognized as valid. It is not certain what the basis for the change in 
position is, but it seems the courts have recognized the injustice that may occur from 
blanket non-recognition. In Azam v Jan, the court acknowledged that in the interest of 
public policy, it should take jurisdiction over valid and invalid foreign polygamous 
marriages. In the decision of the court, the Hyde decision of 1866 is outdated and no 
longer reflects Canadian realities.160This indicates a progressive realization by the court 
                                                 
157 In Canada polygamy is covered under the Criminal Code and Zero Tolerance for Barbaric Cultural 
Practices Act, (S.C 2015, c 29). It is provided that a permanent resident or a foreign national is 
inadmissible on grounds of practicing polygamy if they are or will be practicing polygamy with a person 
who is or will be physically present in Canada at the same time as the permanent resident or foreign 
national. In addition, no person may contract a new marriage until every previous marriage has been 
dissolved by death or by divorce or declared null by a court order (see in general Zero Tolerance for 
Barbaric Cultural Practices Act, ss 2, 4. 
158Yew v Attorney-general of British Columbia (1924), 33 B.C.R. 109. 
159 The exception may be in relation to parties falling under the prohibited degree of consanguinity (see 
generally the Marriage (Prohibited Degrees) Act, 1990, c 46.  
160Azam, supra note 128 at 44. 
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that blanket non-recognition of some foreign unions would leave parties without 
recourse, and this would invariably exclude some immigrant families from rights 
accorded to other Canadians in their marriages. Bailey, for example, has suggested that 
women in foreign polygamous marriages are likely to suffer if the remedies of divorce 
and annulment are not available to them.161 
In Azam, the court exercised jurisdiction over a foreign polygamous marriage by 
acknowledging the marriage for the limited purpose of providing an adequate remedy, 
although the court was satisfied that whatever its foreign legality, it is invalid in 
Canada.162 In granting an order of annulment, the court observed that the purported 
marriage between the applicant and the respondent was void ab initio since the marriage 
did not satisfy the essential requirement relating to the capacity of the man entering into 
another marriage.163 Despite the fact that the marriage was valid under the lex loci 
celebrationis rule, the man being a Canadian domicile, lacked the capacity to enter into 
another marriage while his first marriage subsisted. This position taken by the court 
endorsed the traditional conflict of laws approach to the recognition of foreign marriages 
in Canada, that the marriage must be both formally and essentially valid. In this case, the 
marriage was valid under Pakistan law where it was celebrated, but void under Canadian 
law where the man was domiciled. It must also be mentioned that, the court would have 
come to the same conclusion if it had applied the pre-nuptial rule, since Mr. Jan lacked 
                                                 
161 Martha Bailey et al, “Expanding Recognition of Foreign Polygamous Marriages: Policy Implications for 
Canada”, in Polygamy in Canada: Legal and Social Implications for Women and Children: A Collection of 
Policy and Research Reports (Ottawa: Status of Women Canada, 2005) at 11-12. 
162 In arriving at this decision, the court applied the traditional approach to Canadian conflict of laws in 
respect of marriage.  
163Azam, supra note 128 at 57. 
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the legal capacity in Canada for his subsequent marriage by virtue of his previous 
subsisting marriage.164 
 It is still debatable whether a Canadian court can statutorily exercise divorce 
jurisdiction over a foreign polygamous marriage. Some have suggested that the definition 
of “spouse” under the Divorce Act,165 precludes its application to valid foreign 
polygamous marriages (“spouse” means either of two persons who are married to each 
other).166 However, Bielby J.A has emphasized that the definition of “spouse” in s. 2(1) 
of the Divorce Act arguably does not compel the conclusion that polygamous marriages 
are not recognized. In his opinion, the section may merely indicate that the two (and only 
two) parties to the litigation must be the parties to the marriage even though one of them 
may also be a party to another marriage.167 
In addition to the courts exercising jurisdiction over foreign polygamous 
marriages, the courts now recognize the validity of foreign polygamous marriages for 
other specific purposes, such as inheritance. In Tse v. Minister of Employment and 
Immigration,168 Urie J.A. stated that polygamous marriages valid in the country where 
they were entered into and where the parties were domiciled would be recognized as 
valid by Canadian Courts. However, the recognition does not confer on such relationships 
all the rights associated with monogamous marriage in Canada. In Yew v. Attorney-
General of British Columbia, the court recognized both wives of a polygamous marriage 
as wives for the purpose of succession; this was however a limited recognition.169 In 
                                                 
164 The “pre-nuptial domicile” rule recognizes the community in which the parties plan to live as husband 
and wife as the one primarily interested in the validity of their marriage. 
165 RSC 1985, c 3. 
166Ibid, s 2(1). See also Kaufman, supra note 129 at 333. 
167Azam v Jan, 2012 ABCA 197, at 20. 
168 [1983] 2 F.C. 308 at 311. 
169 See, supra note 158. 
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Bolentiru v Radulescu,170the Ontario Superior Court granted a decree of annulment in 
respect of a marriage celebrated in Bucharest, Romania, between the plaintiff and the 
defendant. The court found that the defendant was already in a validly subsisting 
marriage at the time that he and the plaintiff were married. The court further granted the 
plaintiff compensatory and general damages for work done by the plaintiff and for false 
representation of the defendant.  
Thus, Canadian courts are now ready to grant ancillary relief even where a 
polygamous marriage has been held void. In addition to judicial intervention, some 
provincial legislation also extend aspects of relief to parties in an actively polygamous 
marriage. For example, the Alberta Family Law Act171 provides an adult interdependent 
partner support.172 In Ontario, a person in a polygamous marriage is considered a 
“spouse” and may claim matrimonial relief if the marriage was celebrated in a 
jurisdiction that recognizes it as valid.173 In Hicks v Gallardo, the Ontario Court of 
Appeal interpreted section 1 of the Ontario Family Law Act to include parties who have 
undergone a marriage ceremony or event in good faith but did not have the capacity to 
enter into the marriage (e.g. by reason of prohibited degrees of consanguinity), and 
parties to a voidable marriage, as well as spouses to a polygamous marriage if the 
marriage was celebrated in a jurisdiction that recognizes such unions as legally valid.174 
These decisions clearly represent a shift from the previous position of blanket non- 
recognition to a more benevolent approach.  
                                                 
170[2004] OTC 698. 
171 SA 2003, c F-4.5. 
172 Under the Act “marriage” includes a void marriage and a voidable marriage and “spouse” includes a 
former spouse and a party to a marriage. 
173 Ontario, Family Law Act, RSO 1990, c F. 3, s1 (2); Ontario, Succession Law Reform Act, RSO 1990, c 
S. 26, s 1(2). 
174Hicks v Gallardo, [2013] ONSC 129 at 29. 
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In recognizing polygamous marriage, Canadian courts have emphasized that a 
potentially polygamous marriage could be converted into a monogamous marriage if the 
parties actually live monogamously and changed their domicile to a country where 
polygamy is outlawed.175 In Sara v Sara,176 a potentially polygamous marriage celebrated 
between nationals of India was held to be converted to a monogamous marriage. 
Although the court acknowledged that the marriage under Indian law was potentially 
polygamous, it reasoned that by virtue of the change in domicile to Canada, the parties 
had abandoned their polygamous status. The position taken by the courts in Sara reflects 
upon the fact that the parties although in a potentially polygamous marriage, had lived a 
monogamous life. It is debatable whether the same conclusion would have been reached 
if after change in domicile, the husband was still in a polygamous union. It is not always 
the case that a change in domicile may affect the status of a party. In Azam v. Jan, the 
court found that although the husband acquired domicile in Canada, he was still in a 
polygamous marriage. Mr. Jan remained in his marriage with another woman and 
continued to reside with her and his child while his purported marriage with Ms. Azam 
subsisted.  
It is debatable whether marriages falling under the prohibited degree may also be 
accorded some recognition. Canadian family law policy has been against unions between 
a man, his sister, mother and daughter. Almost certainly the blanket non-recognition of 
these unions may still be upheld on grounds of public policy.177 
                                                 
175 See Re Hassan, supra note 22. 
176[1962], 31 DLR (2d) 566, 38 WWR 143. 
177 It seems that in England, different considerations may be applied where the essential requirements of the 
marriage such as capacity and consent, are absent. In Westminster City Council v C and Others (2009) 2 
WLR 185 the English court refused to recognize a marriage under Bangladesh and Shariah law for the 
reason that one of the parties lacked consent and capacity to enter into the marriage.  They distinguished 
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It is also worth mentioning that the giving of legal recognition to “void 
marriages” is not endemic only to the UK and Canada. In Africa, the courts have long 
developed exceptions to the common law rule that a void marriage has no legal 
consequences.178 For example, the South African law of putative marriage refers to the 
specific instances where a void marriage is visited with limited legal consequences 
despite its invalidity.179 It is trite that a subsisting civil marriage constitutes a bar to any 
of the parties to the marriage entering into another marriage while the civil marriage had 
not been dissolved. Any purported second marriage is consequently bigamous and of no 
legal effect.180 Bigamy is thus a ground for absolute nullity of the second marriage. 
However, the rationale behind the concept of putative marriage is to mitigate the 
harshness of blanket non-recognition of such a marriage to one spouse, and more 
particularly, to mitigate the harsh effects non-recognition will have on the children born 
of the union.181 These issues mostly arise in property distribution and inheritance. 
Essentially, the putative marriage concept allows the putative spouse limited rights as a 
lawful spouse, with the result that upon divorce or the death intestate of one spouse, the 
other acquires a portion of the deceased spouse’s estate on the basis of the principle of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Cheni v Cheni and held that the marriage was sufficiently offensive to the conscience of the English court 
that it should refuse to recognize it. 
178 Under the common law, a marriage that is null and void ab initio produces none of the legal incidents of 
marriage. See H. R. Hahlo, The South African Law of Husband and Wife 4ed (Cape Town: Juta, 1975) at 
487. See also Ex parte Oxton, 1948 (1) SA 1011.  
179 Bradley S. Smith, “Rethinking the Application of the Putative Spouse Doctrine in South African 
Matrimonial Property Law” (2010) 24 Int'l J.L. Pol'y & Fam. 267 at 270. 
180 In Ghana this preposition was applied in questions of legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child. A man 
cannot contract a valid marriage under the Marriage Ordinance while his marriage under customary law 
subsists, nor can he contract a valid marriage under customary law during the continuance of a marriage he 
has contracted under the Ordinance. Any marriage which a man purports to contract by customary law 
while the marriage under the Ordinance subsists is null and void, and any children of that relationship are 
considered illegitimate and are not allowed to share in the estate of the man ( see, Coleman v Shang, [1959] 
GLR 390-409). 




equity.182 The concept allows the bona fide spouse to enforce his or her rights of property 
to which he or she would have been entitled had the marriage been valid. In the case of 
intestacy, Hahlo has asserted that the wife in good faith succeeds to his partner if the 
latter dies intestate.183  In Mograbi v Mograbi,184 the parties went through a form of 
marriage which they both thought was binding, but which was legally invalid. The court 
awarded the plaintiff a share of the estate on the evidence that the plaintiff contributed to 
the acquisition of the estate. Without this benevolent approach, the putative wife may be 
without a remedy.185 
In addition to judicial interventions catering to the interest of the putative spouse, 
African courts give legal recognition to children born out of wedlock or within void 
marriages. Historically, legitimacy was very significant for purposes of succession and 
inheritance. Hitherto, children born out of wedlock or outside a valid subsisting marriage 
were considered illegitimate and not entitled to share in the “father’s” estate. The 
common law rule stated by Heathcote A.J was that “those who are born of a union which 
is entirely odious, and therefore prohibited shall not be called natural children and no 
indulgence whatever shall be extended to them”.186 Accordingly, such children could not 
inherit intestate from their fathers. In the Ghana case of Coleman v Shang,187 the 
deceased first married a woman (Adeline) according to native custom and had children 
                                                 
182 See generally, Smith, supra note 179. 
183 Hahlo, supra note 178 at 497. 
184 1921 AD 275. 
185 In a different but related context, the South African court extended legal recognition to some 
consequences of an Islamic marriage although no statutory recognition was available. In  Hoosein v. 
Dangor, [2010] 2 All SA 55 the husband contended that his marriage was not valid in terms of South 
African law and that the court cannot order for maintenance pendent lite. The court referred to section 
15(3) of the South African Constitution which allows for statutory recognition of other religious laws and 
accordingly ruled that until statutory recognition is given, the court will do justice by giving limited 
recognition to the incidents of Muslim marriages. 
186Frans v. Paschke, (2007) NAHC 49 at 50. 
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by her. He later divorced Adeline and married the plaintiff’s mother (Wilhelmina) under 
the Marriage Ordinance and had five children by her of whom the plaintiff was the sole 
survivor. While the marriage with Wilhelmina was still subsisting, the deceased lived and 
cohabited with the defendant and had 10 children by her. The relationship with the 
defendant was consequently adulterous and unlawful under the existing law. Upon the 
death intestate of the deceased, the issue inter alia, was whether the 10 children born 
during the subsistence of the marriage under the Marriage Ordinance could share in the 
estate of the father. 
The court held that the ten children were illegitimate and not entitled to share in 
the deceased’s estate. The court affirmed the rule that an extra-marital child was not 
recognized as having any legal relationship with his or her father but only with his or her 
mother.188 
 
The decision in Coleman can be criticized as harsh and contrary to the principles 
of justice. Essentially, the sins of the father who committed the adultery was inflicted 
upon the children. To deny the children a share in the estate of the father by reason of the 
illegitimate relationship between their mother and the father inflicts on them a burden or 
disadvantage which they did not create. This is more so when they did not have the 
opportunity to choose their own father. However, as Oppong has rightly argued,at 
present, the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children has become largely 
insignificant – judicial decisions, constitutional and statutory provisions have watered 
                                                 
188 See Green v Fitzgerald and Others, [1914] AD 88 at 99. See also the full discussion in Van Heerden et 
al (eds) Boberg’s Law of Persons and the Family 2nd (Kenwyn: Juta & Co., Ltd, 1999). 
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down the legal significance of the distinction.189 In the cases of In Re Asante (Decd.); 
Asante and Another V. Owusu,190 the Court of Appeal per Essien J.A reiterated the 
position that “a child had by a man with whichever woman, she being a concubine or 
girlfriend or mistress, once accepted by the man as his child is recognized by law as his 
child and this child is entitled to a portion of his estate.”191 This position is supported by 
the judgment of Heathcote A.J in Frans v. Paschke where he stated that the rule that an 
illegitimate child cannot inherit intestate from his father was discriminatory and 
inconsistent with the Namibian constitutional provision that every child shall be known 
and cared for by both parents.192 These provisions are meant to cater for children who 
will be disadvantaged by the strict application of the common law rule on illegitimacy. 
As Hahlo has rightly noted, unlike other areas of the law, there are no 
discretionary powers under which the court may declare an invalid marriage to be 
valid.193 However, the plausible conclusion that can be drawn from the above is that 
courts are ready to extend limited recognition to apparently void unions where to deny 
such recognition will lead to great hardship and injustice. In recognizing the rights of 
both the putative spouse and the “illegitimate child” to share in the estate of the deceased 
spouse and father respectively, the courts did not sanction or warrant the invalid union, 
but considered the incidents of inheritance and succession as separate from the marriage.  
                                                 
189 See Oppong, supra note 72. 
190[1992] 1 GLR 119–129. 
191Ibid at 126. See also Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1992, art. 28(1)(b); and the Children’s Act 
1998, s. 7. Both provide that ‘every child, whether or not born in wedlock shall be entitled to reasonable 
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As far as the “domestic” law is concerned, polygamous marriages celebrated in 
England and Canada are void ab initio and would not be recognized. This extends to 
polygamous marriages contracted outside jurisdiction by individuals domiciled in Canada 
or UK. Attempting to enter into such a marriage could lead to criminal charges in both 
jurisdictions. On the contrary, unions which are not recognized within the two 
jurisdictions are given recognition when entered into by foreign nationals, although the 
recognition may be for specific purposes. The courts by this approach, are able to resolve 
some injustices that may occur from blanket non-recognition of such unions. This 
approach taken by the UK and Canada is a classic illustration of how states may deal with 
the recognition of foreign unions that are not allowed within/under their jurisdictions. 
The next section considers the conflict of laws aspect of same-sex marriage in 
Canada and the United Kingdom. 
 
 
4. Recognition of Same-sex Marriage in Canada 
4.1 Domestic recognition of same-sex marriage in Canada 
 
The current legislative framework under which same-sex marriage in Canada is 
regulated is the Civil Marriage Act.194 The enactment of the Civil Marriage Act follows a 
plethora of judicial decisions that invalidated the heterosexual requirement for civil 
marriage in Canada.  The Act extends the capacity to marry to same-sex couples. It 
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includes some consequential amendments to many statutes and a redefinition of the word 
“spouse” to mean “either of two persons who are married to each other”.195 
 For civil purposes, marriage is defined as the lawful union of two persons to the 
exclusion of all others.196 This definition is in line with court decisions which said that 
the common law definition of marriage was discriminatory against same-sex couples. 
Essentially, the Act recognizes the right of same-sex partners to civil marriage. A 
marriage is not void or voidable by reason only that the spouses are of the same-sex.197 
This places same-sex couples and heterosexual couples in the same legal position in 
Canada. Unlike under the previous regime where same-sex couples were granted only the 
right to enter into domestic civil partnerships, the Civil Marriage Act grants legal status 
to same-sex couples who marry under the Act. 
In line with religious concern, about the drafting of the Act, the Civil Marriage 
Act acknowledges and recognizes freedom of religion and belief. Religious leaders are 
not obligated to celebrate a same-sex marriage if it is against their religious beliefs. There 
is no criminal or regulatory sanction for any religious leader who refuses to perform a 
same-sex marriage. This issue was considered during the promulgation of the Act. 
Religious leaders wanted to be sure that refusal to recognize such unions would not lead 
to prosecution. Thus, section 3 of the Act clarifies that “officials of religious groups are 
free to refuse to perform marriages that are not in accordance with their religious 
                                                 
195Supra note 120, s 3. 
196Supra note 113, s 2. 
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beliefs”.198 This supports the freedom of conscience and belief guaranteed in the 
Canadian Charter. 
Section 5 of the Civil Marriage Act settles one area of conflict of laws in respect 
to marriages celebrated in Canada by parties who have their respective domicile in 
another country. It is provided that  
a marriage that is performed in Canada and that would be valid in 
Canada if the spouses were domiciled in Canada is valid for the 
purposes of Canadian law even though either or both of the spouses do 
not at the time of the marriage have the capacity to enter into it under 
the law of their respective state of domicile.199 
 
This provision is significant since Canada does not require residency to be an 
essential requirement for the celebration of marriage in Canada. The provision makes 
Canada a “safe-haven” for many gay and lesbian couples.200 Essentially, gay and lesbian 
couples can migrate to Canada with the express purpose of having their marriage 
celebrated there. The law recognizes such marriages as valid and there is no requirement 
of proof that the parties reside in Canada. The provision raises important conflict of laws 
issues in terms of recognition of such marriages by the parties’ respective countries of 
domicile. The provision does not address migratory or evasive marriages.201 It is arguable 
whether such marriages may be recognized by the country of domicile of the parties. The 
potential of this provision creating absurd results is imminent. Parties who have had their 
                                                 
198Supra note 113, s 3. See also Rex Ahdar, “Solemnisation of same-sex marriage and religious freedom” 
(2014) Ecclesiastical Law Journal 1. 
199Supra note 113, s 5. 
200 In June 2014, Canada organised a mass gay and lesbian wedding for couples irrespective of their 
domicile. See generally Diana Mehta, “First mass gay wedding in Canada draws couples from around 
the world”, Canada Press 27 June 2014 online: http://news.nationalpost.com/2014/06/27/first-mass-gay-
wedding-in-canada-draws-couples-from-around-the-world/>. 
201 Koppelman defines “evasive marriage” as cases in which parties have traveled out of their home state 
for the express purpose of evading that state’s prohibition of their marriage and thereafter immediately 
returned home”. See, Andrews Koppelman, Same-sex, Different States: When Same-Sex Marriages Cross 
State Lines (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006) at 101.  
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marriages celebrated in Canada, may upon returning home find that the marriage is not 
recognized. This is the limping marriage phenomenon.   
Another debatable provision of the Civil Marriage Act is section 7. Before the 
Amendment of the Civil Marriage Act, divorce jurisdiction under the Civil Marriage Act 
was regulated under the Divorce Act.202 A court in a province has jurisdiction to hear and 
determine a divorce proceeding if either spouse has been ordinarily resident in the 
province for at least one year immediately preceding the commencement of the 
proceeding.203 
Essentially, the Civil Marriage Act made residency a requirement for Canadian 
courts to exercise divorce jurisdiction involving both residents and non-residents. In the 
context of equality, the provision set up the same regime for both same-sex couples and 
heterosexual couples. Also from a private international law perspective, the rule provides 
clarity regarding the basis for the exercise of divorce jurisdiction in Canada. However, 
the provision had the effect of creating absurd results where non-domiciled and non-
resident same-sex couples who had their marriages celebrated in Canada were unable to 
obtain divorce in their home countries or elsewhere.204 These are mainly cases where the 
laws in the place of their respective domiciles do not recognize same-sex marriages. This 
same-sex couple, even though validly married in Canada, could not obtain a divorce in 
Canada because they were unable to meet the one-year residency jurisdictional 
requirement. They were thus left in a legal limbo: they could not obtain divorce in their 
                                                 
202 The Civil Marriage Act originally related only to marriage. 
203 RSC 1985, c 3 (2nd Supp), s 3. 
204 Although the same argument could be made for opposite sex couples it is worth noting that the 
recognition of heterosexual marriages from a conflict of laws perspective has not been a matter of much 
contention. In most cases the courts will recognize the marriage if it is valid under both the lex loci 
celebrationis and the lex domicilii rules. 
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country of domicile because their marriage was unrecognized, and they could not obtain 
divorce in Canada because they did not live in Canada. 
In 2012, the government introduced Bill, Bill C-32, the Civil Marriage of Non-
Residents Act, to amend the divorce regime for non-residents. The bill divided the Act 
into two parts and created a section for the “Dissolution of Marriage for Non-Resident 
Spouses”. The amendment makes all marriages of non-resident couples that were 
performed in Canada valid under Canadian law, therefore allowing these couples to end 
their marriage if they cannot get a divorce in their home country. Section 7 of the Act 
now provides a new legal process for non-residents who married in Canada to dissolve 
their marriage in Canada if they are unable to seek divorce under the law of their home 
country because their marriage is not recognized there. The current regime is different 
from the one applicable to same and opposite sex spouses residing in Canada which is 
governed by the Divorce Act.  
Some have argued that this new remedial provision creates more problems than it 
solves.205 Just like section 5, the new amendment to section 7 has the potential to create 
absurdity from a conflict of laws perspective. It is arguable how the rights and obligations 
created under a divorce order in Canada may be recognized by the respective domicile of 
the parties. Bornheim, for example, has rightly noted that the two provisions “go too far 
because they apply Canadian law even though there is minimal territorial connection with 
Canada, thus furthering the problem of limping relationships.206 Several collateral issues 
of divorce, especially corollary relief, like the division of the matrimonial property, may 
                                                 
205 See generally Jean Gabriel Castel & Matthew E. Castel, “The Marriage and Divorce in Canada of Non 
Domiciled and Non-Resident Persons” (2012) 31:3 Canadian Family Law Quarterly 297. 
206 See Jan J. Bornheim, “Same-sex marriages in Canadian Private International Law” (2013-2013) 51:1 
Alta. L. Rev. 77 at 80. 
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be difficult to enforce in the country of domicile where the courts refuse jurisdiction. The 
end result is to leave the parties with orders which cannot be enforced. 
In summary, the Civil Marriage Act has addressed the issue of same-sex marriage 
in Canada. Gay and lesbian couples may now legally have the status of marriage 
conferred on them with all attendant effects. This has placed same-sex marriage on a 
parallel legal footing with heterosexual marriage. However, although the country may not 
have problems in respect of same-sex marriages celebrated in Canada by individuals 
domiciled in Canada, the non-requirement of residence for the purposes of marriage and 
divorce may create some impractical results from a conflict of laws perspective.  
 
4.2 Private International Law Aspects of Same-sex Marriage in Canada 
 
From a conflict of laws perspective, the question whether individuals domiciled in 
Canada have capacity to enter into a foreign same-sex marriage and, consequently, 
whether such a relationship can be recognized in Canada has been settled by the 
recognition of same-sex marriage in Canada. Given the domestic recognition of same-sex 
marriage in Canada, individuals domiciled in Canada are able to enter into foreign same-
sex marriage and this marriage will be recognized in Canada so far as the marriage is 
valid as required by the form. This is because Canada applies the lex domicilli to 
determine the legality of such marriage, and the lex loci celebrationis in respect to the 
form of the marriage.  
In terms of same-sex marriage recognition, another aspect in the context of 
private international law is the treatment in Canadian courts of same-sex foreign unions 
entered into by foreign domiciles. In this case, Canadian courts give effect to status or 
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legal obligations created by a foreign same-sex marriage. A case in point is Hicks v 
Gallardo. Hicks involved a civil partnership between the appellant, Mr. Gallardo and the 
respondent, Mr. Hincks, celebrated in the UK under the Civil Partnership Act 2004 (UK). 
As a same-sex couple, they were not permitted to marry in the United Kingdom.207 The 
civil partnership regime then in existence operated as a separate but equal system 
exclusive to same-sex couples and was the legal equivalent of marriage under UK law. 
The couple, after the civil union, moved to Ontario where they lived for a year before 
they separated. The respondent later brought an application in the Superior Court of 
Ontario seeking divorce and other relief pursuant to the provisions of the Divorce Act,208 
and the Family Law Act.209 The issue, inter alia, was whether the parties were considered 
to be spouses under the Divorce Act210 and the Family Law Act. In other words, whether 
the court can recognize the parties as spouse in terms of the Divorce Act and the Family 
Law Act. The Superior Court agreed with the conclusion of the trial court that the parties 
were “spouses” as defined by the Divorce Act and s. 1 of the Family Law Act.  
The court placed emphasis on section 1 of the Family Law Act which makes 
provision, among others, for parties to relationships that are both formally and 
functionally equivalent to marriage. Essentially, the UK Civil Partnership Act provided a 
legal regime for same-sex couples equivalent to marriage.  The Court reasoned that any 
other interpretation of the legislation would result in an anomalous situation where parties 
to marriages that are not legal in Canada, such as polygamous marriages, can be 
considered spouses but parties to same-sex marriages, which are legal in Canada, cannot 
                                                 
207 At present the UK recognizes same-sex marriage under the Marriage (Same-sex Couples) Act. Marriage 
between same-sex couples now has the same legal status as marriage celebrated between heterosexuals. 
208 R.S.C. 1985, c 3. 
209 R.S.O. 1990, c F.3. 
210 R.S.C. 1985, c 3. 
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be considered spouses. In essence, the court was ready to grant the parties relief under the 
Divorce Act and Family Law Act, although on a strict interpretation of the legislation, the 
parties’ civil partnership was not marriage. The decision in Hincks illustrates the fact that 
the court was prepared to characterize the relationship as equivalent to a marriage under 
Ontario law, the lex fori. Essentially, the requirement is for the court to be satisfied that 
the marriage/union is formally recognized under the laws of the place of celebration. The 
objective is to treat couples who have lawfully entered into same-sex marriage or 
marriage-like relationships in other states as the equivalent of being married in Canada. 
In this case, the civil partnership was valid under the UK Civil Partnership Act. 
Given the domestic recognition of same-sex marriage in Canada, it is suggested 
that Canadian courts will recognize the validity of same-sex marriage or legally 
recognized registered partnerships that are entered into in other jurisdictions if the 
relationship certifies both the lex celebrationis and the lex domicilii rule.211 This avoids 
the “limping marriage” effect where same-sex marriage recognized in one jurisdiction 
may not be recognized in other jurisdictions. It must, however, be mentioned that the 
strict application of the lex domicilii and the lex loci celebrationis rules may prevent 
parties from having capacity to contract a valid same-sex marriage or may be an obstacle 
to a recognition of this marriage. However, the Canadian courts have recognized same-
sex marriage even where the parties lack the capacity to enter into such a marriage under 
their respective domicile.  
                                                 
211 One issue that may arise is whether in the light of the fact that Canada recognizes same-sex marriages, 
public policy may be used to uphold same-sex marriages celebrated abroad by persons domiciled in Canada 
where the marriage is invalid under the laws of the place of celebration. A and B domiciled and nationals of 
Canada marry in South Africa and return to Canada. Can the marriage be recognized as valid in Canada? It 
is suggested that in such a case Canada may adopt the same approach to the recognition of certain domestic 
unions which are not recognized in Canada and recognize the effects of the union. 
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The case of V & L v. Attorney General of Canada212 illustrates the potential 
absurdity that may occur from a strict application of the traditional conflict of laws rules 
relating to marriage, and how Canadian courts have resolved the apparent absurdity that 
may occur from the strict application of the lex domicilii principle. A lesbian couple, one 
domiciled in England and the other domiciled in Florida, married in Canada in 2005 and 
separated in 2009. At the time of their marriage, neither had the capacity to enter into the 
same-sex marriage because England and Florida did not recognize same-sex marriage at 
the time. The issue brought to the court was whether a Canadian court had jurisdiction in 
an application for divorce. The Attorney General of Canada argued, inter alia, that the 
Superior Court of Ontario did not have jurisdiction to grant the applicants divorce 
because under principles of private international law which is respected in Canada, the 
applicants were not legally married under Canadian Law. In essence, the status of being 
married is a requirement for divorce. Since at the time of the marriage, the parties lacked 
the capacity to get married, the marriage was void and a divorce was impossible.213 From 
a private international law perspective the Attorney general correctly stated the traditional 
conflict of laws position in Canada that for a marriage to be legally valid under Canadian 
law, the parties must satisfy both the requirements of the law of the place where the 
marriage is celebrated (the lex loci celebrationis) with regard to the formal requirements 
and the requirement of the law of domicile of the couple with regard to their legal 
capacity to marry one another. In this case neither party had the legal capacity to marry a 
person of the same-sex under their respective domicile Florida and England.  
                                                 
212 (05 April 2011), Ottawa 11/367893 (Ont Superior Court). 
213  Bornheim, supra note 206 at 80. 
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The court, however, granted the applicants a constitutional exemption to allow the 
applicant a divorce in Canada. In coming to this decision, the court acknowledged that 
the willingness of the Canadian government to grant the Joint Applicants' marriage but to 
deny them any access to a legal divorce leaves them entirely without recourse. In the 
opinion of the Court, it was legally and procedurally unfair for a government to grant the 
right to marry, to perform such marriages and to then leave the Joint Applicants with 
absolutely no remedy.  
Essentially, the court in the V & L case appreciated the traditional conflict of laws 
position in Canada but found that the strict application of the rule will be unfair in the 
context of the applicants’ case. Although England will not grant L divorce, her marriage 
to V prevented her from entering into a civil partnership in England. A strict application 
of the conflict of laws rule would mean that V &L would continue to live under a 
relationship which has evidently broken down beyond reconciliation.   Given the current 
legislation on the dissolution of marriage for non-resident spouses, Canada has again 
solved a potential conflict of laws issue that may arise from same-sex marriages 
celebrated in Canada by non-resident individuals. 
An equally important aspect of the recognition of same-sex marriage is the issue 
of inheritance and recognition of foreign adoption orders. The next two sections consider 









A conflict of laws issue which arises in same-sex marriage is succession. Does a 
surviving partner have the right to inherit the estate of a partner who is deceased? In most 
jurisdictions, succession is based on the concept of family. In general, under Canadian 
laws, marriage or adoption may create this formal legal link.214  Given the domestic 
recognition of same-sex marriage in Canada, a surviving same-sex spouse will be entitled 
to inherit his/her deceased spouse’s estate upon the latter dying intestate. This places 
same-sex couples in the same position with heterosexual couples. The issue is whether 
the same recognition will be given to a foreign same-sex surviving spouse. In general, 
where a marital relationship is established, the court will recognize the right of the 
surviving same-sex spouse to inherit the estate of his/her deceased spouse. A state that 
recognizes the spousal rights of a same-sex couple will invariably give recognition to 
similar rights or benefits from other states or countries. 215 Essentially, proof of the 
existence of the relationship by the surviving spouse will entitle the surviving spouse to 




One issue of intestacy is the right of an adopted child to inherit his/her adoptive 
parents’ properties. This issue has become necessary because of the structural changes in 
                                                 
214 See generally Alberta: Wills and Succession Act, SA 2010, c W-12.2; British Columbia: Wills, Estates 
and Succession Act, SBC 2009, c 13; Intestate Succession Act. R.S., c. 236, s 1. 
215See Symeon C. Symeonides, “Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2014: Twenty-Eighth Annual 
Survey” (2015) 63 AM. J. COMP. L. at 71. 
216 See generally Alberta’s Family Law Act; Ontario, Family Law Act, s 1 (2); Ontario, Succession Law 
Reform Act, s 1(2). 
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the concept of family.217 What rights, if any, does an adopted child have over his/her 
deceased same-sex parents’ properties? In Canada, adoption and child welfare fall under 
provincial jurisdiction. Each province has its own laws and regulations. In Nova Scotia, 
for instance, a person may adopt a person younger than the adopter.218 In British 
Columbia, an adult or two adults jointly may apply to the court to adopt a child.219 In 
general, same-sex couples are entitled to apply for an adoption order under both federal 
and provincial legislations. Statutes that previously denied same-sex couples the right of 
adoption of a child have been declared unconstitutional.220 This helps same-sex couples 
to create family unions that include children either from a pre-existing heterosexual 
relationship, or children born during the same-sex relationship. This indicates a 
significant change in the concept of family which has hitherto been premised on affinity 
and consanguinity.221 
An adoption order has the effect of permanently severing the ties of the adopted 
child from his/her biological parents and placing new rights and responsibilities onto the 
adoptive parents.222 In essence, unless expressly provided, the adopted child cannot 
inherit from his/her biological parents upon their death intestate. The adopted person 
becomes the child of the adoptive parents and the adoptive parents become the parents of 
the adopted child, as if the adopted child had been born in lawful wedlock to the adoptive 
                                                 
217 See generally Susan N. Gary, “Adapting Intestacy Laws to Changing Families” (2000) 18:1 Law and 
Inequality 1. 
218 Nova Scotia, Children and Family Services Act, SNS 1990, c 5, s 72(1). 
219 British Columbia, Adoption Act, RSBC 1996, c 5, s 29. It has been mentioned that British Columbia is 
second province after Quebec to amend its legislation to effectively permit adoption of a child by same-sex 
couples (see Donald G Casswell, “Any Two Persons in Lotusland, British Columbia” in Robert Wintemute 
and Mads Andenẽs ed, Legal Recognition of Same-sex Partnership: A study of National European and 
International Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2001) at 228. 
220 See for example Re K. & B [1995] 125 D.L.R. 
221 Same-sex couples’ rights to adopt is beneficial to male couples who are less capable to benefit from 
advances in assisted reproductive technologies than families with at least one female. 
222 See generally Alberta: Child, Youth and Family Enhancement Act, RSA 2000, c C-12, s 72. 
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parents.223 This creates a new set of rights in the adopted child vis-a-vis his/her adoptive 
parents. These include the right of the adopted child to inherit his/her adoptive parents’ 
properties. Under the Nova Scotia Children and Family Services Act, for example, in any 
enactment, conveyance, trust, settlement, devise, bequest or other instrument, "child" or 
"issue" or the equivalent of either includes an adopted child.224 Thus unless the contrary 
is stated, a reference to a person described in terms of their relationship by blood to 
another person includes an adopted child. This places the adopted child in the same 
position as any biological child born to the adoptive parents. 
From a conflict of laws perspective, the fact that Canada does not discriminate 
between heterosexual and homosexual adoption is significant for the purposes of 
succession. Can a foreign adopted child inherit from his or her same-sex adoptive 
parents? Given the domestic recognition of the rights of the adopted child of a same-sex 
couple to inherit from his or her parents, it may be concluded that a Canadian court may 
recognize an adoption order from a foreign court.225 In other words, Canadian courts will 
give effect to an adoption order and the effect that flows from it if it complies with the 
laws of the place where it was ordered.226 However, the position may be different in 
jurisdictions that do not recognize domestic partnerships or same-sex marriages. 
Whatever the case, to withhold this benefit and protection from these children would 
leave them in a vulnerable and unjust position.  More so when the child, at the time of the 
adoption, had no control over who his or her parents were.227 
                                                 
223 Nova Scotia, Children and Family Services Act, SNS 1990, c 5, s 80. 
224Ibid, s 80(4). 
225 See Canada, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, “International Adoption and the Immigration 
Process” (Ottawa: CIC, 2000) at 7. 
226 See generally Carissa Trast, “You Can't Choose Your Parents: Why Children Raised by Same-Sex 




In sum, the right of an adopted child to inherit from his or her adoptive parents is 
inherent to the adoption, irrespective of the place of adoption or the status of the adoptive 
parents. The fact that a state does not recognize the legal relationship between the 
adoptive parents is not enough grounds to disinherit the child from succeeding to his/her 
adoptive parents’ properties.   
 
5. Recognition of Same-sex Marriage in the United Kingdom 
 
The United Kingdom is among the few countries which recognize same-sex 
marriage under its Marriage (Same-sex Couples) Act. Before the enactment of this 
statute, the UK had in place a civil partnership regime that allowed same-sex couples to 
enter into domestic partnerships recognized under UK law. The enactment of the 
Marriage (Same-sex Couples) Act now enables individuals who are domiciled in the UK 
to enter into same-sex marriages in the UK with all the benefits associated with marriage. 
The domestic recognition of same-sex marriage presents a conflict of laws issue as to 
how the UK courts will treat a same-sex marriage entered into by parties domiciled 
outside the UK.   
This section provides a brief overview of the domestic regulations of same-sex 
marriage in the UK. It looks at the conflict of laws issues that are generated from this 
recognition and how they are resolved 
 
5.1 Domestic recognition of same-sex marriage in the United Kingdom 
 
Before the enactment of the Marriage (Same-sex Couples) Act, same-sex 
marriage in the UK was regulated under the Civil Partnership Act. However, the Civil 
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Partnership Act only enabled same-sex couples to enter into civil partnership, though it 
provided exactly the same benefits as offered to a heterosexual marriage.228Same-sex 
couples were openly able to enjoy rights, greater equality, acceptance and the social 
recognition given to heterosexual couples, but the status of marriage was not available to 
homosexual individuals. Same-sex couples were not entitled to call each other “husband” 
or “wife” for legal purposes. The Civil Partnership Act created what is termed “a separate 
but equal regime for same-sex couples”. This was in line with the Matrimonial Causes 
Act, 1973, which provided that a marriage is void if the parties are not respectively male 
and female.229  These provisions reflected the heterosexual nature of marriage in UK at 
the time. 
Same-sex marriage is presently regulated under the Marriage (Same-sex Couples) 
Act. The Act provides for the legal recognition of same-sex couples. In essence, marriage 
has the same effect in relation to same-sex couples as it has in relation to heterosexual 
couples.230 
Like the Canadian Civil Marriage Act, there is no compulsion to solemnize a 
same-sex marriage. Essentially, a person does not contravene a provision of the Act if 
they do not consent to a marriage being conducted solely for it being a marriage of a 
same-sex couple. These provisions are meant to protect religious leaders who may refuse 
to solemnize a same-sex marriage on grounds of religious belief.231 
                                                 
228 Civil partnership is limited to same-sex couples.  
229Supra note 153, s 11. 
230Supra note 114, s 11. 
231  Ahdar, supra note 198. 
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The Act enables civil partners to convert their civil partnership into marriage.232 
But this does not change the nature of civil partnership; it still remains open to same-sex 
couples. This means that same-sex couples in the UK have the choice to marry under the 
Marriage (Same-sex Couples) Act or register as civil partnerships. 
There are also provisions for overseas marriage which enables United Kingdom 
nationals to marry in prescribed countries or territories outside the United Kingdom.  
In summary, The Marriage (Same-sex Couples) Act grants same-sex couples the 
status of marriage in the UK. Individuals domiciled in the UK have the legal capacity to 
enter into same-sex marriages and such unions will be recognized in the UK. A state that 
recognizes same-sex marriage will typically recognize a foreign same-sex marriage. The 
next section looks at the private international law aspects of same-sex marriage in the 
UK.  
 
5.2 Private International Law Aspects of Same-sex Marriage in the UK 
 
Before the enactment of the Marriage (Same-sex Couples) Act, the UK had in 
place legislative provisions that regulated the private international law aspects of a same-
sex marriage. Although the UK did not domestically recognize same-sex marriages, 
legislative provisions were put in place for the recognition of foreign same-sex marriages. 
In the context of conflict of laws, the Civil Partnership Act provided a regime where 
same-sex couples married in a foreign country will be recognized under the Civil 
Partnership Act. The recognition of a foreign marriage was regulated under the Civil 
Partnership (Treatment of Overseas Relationships)Order 2005 (SI 2005/3042). The 
                                                 
232Supra note 114, s 9. 
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Order created a regime where foreign same-sex marriage would be recognized in the UK, 
although there was no domestic recognition of same-sex marriage in the UK. This made 
it possible for same-sex couples to have their foreign marriages registered without the 
need to re-register under the Civil Partnership Act. In essence, the order provided relief 
for foreign same-sex couples. Although the legal status of marriage was not available to 
same-sex couples, the relief under the Civil Partnership Act was essentially the same as 
that accorded to heterosexual couples. The rule was that if same-sex marriage was 
recognized at the place of celebration and the respective domicile of the parties, then it 
would be recognized as a civil partnership for the purpose of UK law.  This was because 
the UK characterized the foreign same-sex marriage as a civil partnership under the Civil 
Partnership Act. 
Wilkinson v Kitzinger233 illustrates the treatment of foreign same-sex marriage, in 
the UK under the Civil Partnership Act.  Wilkinson involved a claim by the petitioners 
that their same-sex marriage celebrated in Canada should be recognized as such in 
England. The parties, both domiciled in the UK, were married in a civil marriage 
ceremony at the Office of the Marriage Commissioner in Vancouver, British Columbia, 
Canada in 2003. The parties subsequently moved to the UK and sought a declaration that 
the marriage was a recognized marriage pursuant to s.55 of the Family Law Act 1996. 
Under the UK Civil Partnership Act, a foreign/overseas same-sex marriage will 
automatically be recognized as a civil partnership without the parties having to register it 
again. Thus, the law only recognizes a civil partnership where a civil marriage has been 
validly contracted abroad. The Petitioner argued that, in denying her and the first 
Respondent the name and formal status of marriage and "downgrading" her Canadian 
                                                 
233 [2006] EWHC 2022. 
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marriage to the status of a civil partnership, the impact of the measure upon her is hurt, 
humiliation, frustration and outrage. However, the court relied on its private international 
law rules and emphasized that legal capacity to marry is judged according to the laws of 
the parties' domicile. Since under the English law same-sex marriage was not recognized, 
the parties, being English domiciliaries did not have the legal capacity to enter into the 
same-sex marriage in Canada. In conclusion, the court relied on section 11 of the 
Matrimonial Causes Act which provided that "A marriage celebrated after 30 July 1971 
shall be void on the following grounds,   
(c) That the parties are not respectively male and female"234 
In essence, English law recognized only marriages celebrated between the 
opposite sexes. The court cited with approval the decision of the House of Lords in Mette 
v Mette235 and Brooks v Brooks,236 that where a person of English domicile purports to 
marry in another jurisdiction, but the parties lack capacity to marry in English law, the 
marriage is not recognized in England.  
Although Wilkinson may have created “hurt, humiliation, frustration and outrage”, 
as the petitioners argued, the decision reached by the court was accurate from a conflict 
of laws perspective. For the marriage to be valid, it must be both formally and essentially 
valid. However, the parties were not without a remedy. As already said, the Civil 
Partnership Act created a regime analogous to a marriage with benefits similar to a legal 
marriage. Thus, although in a legal sense the parties’ foreign marriage was not 
recognized as “marriage” in the legal sense, they were entitled to all the reliefs provided 
to civil partners under the Civil Partnership Act. 
                                                 
234Supra note 153, s 11. 
235 [1859] 1 Sw & Tr 416. 
236 [1861] 9 HL Cas 193. 
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At present, a marriage under the law of any country or territory outside the United 
Kingdom is no longer denied recognition under the law of England only because it is the 
marriage of a same-sex couple. In essence, the rules applicable to the recognition of 
heterosexual marriages are equally applied to the recognition of foreign same-sex 
marriages.  
The domestic recognition of same-sex marriage in the UK will typically lead to 
recognizing a foreign same-sex marriage. As Symeonides rightly stated, “a state that 
allows same-sex marriages within its territory has no legitimate public policy reason to 
deny recognition to similar marriages or unions from other states or countries”.237 
However, the conflict of laws rule applied in Wilkinson may still apply to determine 
whether the parties to a same-sex marriage had the capacity to enter into the marriage.  In 





It is apparent that the public policy exception has not always led to the non- 
recognition of certain foreign unions that are considered to violate the laws of the UK and 
Canada. This is a sharp departure from the former position in the two countries where an 
English court or a Canadian court would refuse to recognize a foreign marriage which is 
deemed to be repugnant to the laws and public policy of the two countries, even when the 
formal and essential validity of the marriage is beyond question. However, at present, 
marriages dissimilar to that practiced in the UK and Canada, such as polygamy and 
                                                 
237  Symeonides, supra note 215 at 71. 
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incestuous unions which are apparently considered repugnant and odious in the two 
countries are given recognition in both, although citizens and individuals domiciled in the 
two countries are not allowed to enter into such unions. The approach has been to 
distinguish cases that establish the validity of the union and appear to establish 
acceptance of the marriage, from incidental issues between the parties. This approach is 
also evident in Africa in the area of putative marriage and children born of unions which 
are void. In all these cases, there is a recognition that there are many incidents of 
marriage beyond the lawfulness or otherwise of the marriage.  Thus, the courts are ready 
to recognize a foreign union which is not domestically recognized in the country so long 
















CHAPTER FOUR: THE CONFLICT OF LAWS ASPECTS OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE IN 




In most African countries, same-sex relationships are seen as un-African or are 
simply unaccepted. The family structures in Africa support heterosexual marriage, as 
African culture places a high level of importance on marriage and child bearing.238  It is 
debatable whether this same value can be placed on a marriage between people of the 
same-sex because “they cannot procreate”. Even so, same-sex relationships continue to 
exist in Africa. Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa are some of the countries which accept 
certain same-sex marriages under custom.239 Among the Kukatus ethnic group in Kenya, 
for instance, woman-to-woman marriages are common. 
Notwithstanding the glimpses of evidence, the trend of anti-same-sex legislation 
in some African countries depicts a blanket non-recognition of same-sex unions. An 
important but often ignored aspect of the debate of same-sex marriage is how such 
relationships should be handled by the conflict of laws regimes in African countries. 
Indeed, the nature of conflict of laws is such that even countries which do not formally 
                                                 
238 Kyalo, for example, says that marriage in Africa is geared towards procreation and promotion of life. 
Kyalo cites with approval the observation of Eric O. Ayisi, An Introduction to The Study of African Culture 
(Nairobi: East African Publishers, 1997) that marriage is a means by which a man and woman come 
together to form a union for the purpose of procreation. He stressed further that African marriages are 
effected for just this purpose and therefore a childless marriage ceases to be meaningful in this context (see 
Paul Kyalo, “A Reflection on the African Traditional Values of Marriage and Sexuality” 2012) 1:2 
International Journal of Academic Research in Progressive Education and Development 211 at 211-213. 
This may explain why polygamy is well established in most African countries. 
239 See in general, Hidetoshi Katakami, “Female Husbands and the House-property Complex: Re-
examination of the two guiding concepts in the literature on Woman-marriage”(1998) 1998:52 Journal of 
African Studies 51; See Regine Smith Oboler, “Is the Female Husband a Man? Woman/Woman Marriage 
among the Nandi of Kenya” (1980) 19:1 Ethnology 69; See generally B. Oomen, “Traditional woman-to-
woman marriages, and the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act” (2000) 63:2 Journal of Contemporary 
Roman-Dutch Law 274; See generally Beth Greene, “The Institution of Woman-Marriage in Africa: A 
Cross-Cultural Analysis” (1998) 37:4 Ethnology 395; See Eileen Jensen Krige, “Woman-Marriage, With 
Special Reference to the Lovedu-Its Significance for the Definition of Marriage” (1974) 44:1 Journal of the 
International African Institute 11. 
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allow the institutionalization of same-sex relationships may have to deal with it in a 
conflict of laws sense.   
This chapter focuses on English-speaking African countries which have little to 
no experience with same-sex marriage. In some African countries there is no current 
legislation on the subject (e.g. Ghana), others have enacted legislation on the subject (e.g. 
Nigeria, Zambia) and some countries are contemplating legislation on the subject. From 
the backdrop of chapters three and four, this chapter explores how these countries may 
approach the various private international law issues which may arise before their courts 
in respect to same-sex unions, whether there is legislation on the subject or not. The 
chapter uses hypothetical case scenarios, proffers solutions to those scenarios and 
assesses the merits of those solutions.  
 
2. Same-sex Relationships in the African Context 
 
The acceptance/recognition of gay and lesbian rights has recently received a 
considerable amount of attention in many African countries. Opposition to same-sex 
relationships in Africa is founded on many complex grounds, including a mixture of 
religious, cultural, political and anti-colonial sentiments.240 However, while some view 
same-sex relationships as un-African, there are others who believe they existed among 
some indigenous African tribes. Indeed, it has been argued that same-sex relationships, in 
                                                 
240 Interestingly, there appears to be a customary practice in some African countries which allows a woman 
to marry another woman. As recently, as 2011, such a marriage was recognized by the Kenyan High Court 
for the purposes of inheritance in the Matter of the Estate of Cherotich Kimong’ony Kibserea (Deceased), 
Succession Cause No. 212 of 2010 (High Court, Kenya, 2011). Justice Jackson Ojwang found that, in the 
Nandi culture, a childless woman could marry another woman to bear children for her and the children 
would be considered to belong to the childless woman. This was an established family institution in Nandi 
customary law, and such traditional practices were aspects of culture that were protected under Article 11 
(1) of the 2010 Constitution. 
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one form or another, have always existed in Africa. Murray and Roscoe have mentioned 
that in their opinion, “homosexuality being absent or incidental to Africa is just a myth 
created about Africa by Europeans”.241 In their book, Boy-Wives and Female Husbands: 
Studies of African Homosexuality, they present anthropological evidence showing 
instances of homosexuality in many parts of Africa. Davidson, for example, gives an 
account of a 1958 visit to a Dakar boy brothel. He asserted that Dakar was the “gay” city 
of West Africa.  Gaudio emphasized the presence of male lesbians and other queer 
notions in some Hausa communities in Nigeria. One thing that these authors have 
overlooked are the issues of regulation regarding such relationships at the time. The 
pertinent question is whether such relationships were sanctioned by law. Was the practice 
overtly carried out so that people comfortably identified themselves as being in such 
relationships? These questions are germane to understanding the attitude of Africans 
towards homosexuals. 
Indeed, notwithstanding these historical examples, it can be asserted that the 
normative social imperative to marrying and procreation is considered fundamental in 
many African communities.242 Most African countries spend a great deal of time painting 
marriage as an institution built around procreation. In some jurisdictions, barrenness and 
sterility are a ground for divorce.243 The issue of procreation thus seems to override any 
affinities of “would-be homosexuals” in Africa. This is supported by the many 
                                                 
241 See generally Stephen O. Murray and Will Roscoe eds, Boy-wives and female husbands: studies in 
African homosexualities (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998). 
242  See in general Kyalo, supra note 238; Ayisi, supra note 238. 
243  See Ghana: Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971, s 41(3) (c). It is difficult to argue that having children has 
much of anything to do with marriage. As was correctly pointed out by the South African Constitutional 
Court in Fourie, limiting the State’s interest in marriage to its "procreative potential" … is "deeply 
demeaning" to married couples who cannot or choose not to have children (Minister of Home Affairs v. 
Fourie, 2006 (1) SA 524 at 558). 
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polygamous systems among most African countries. In most African cultures, inheritance 
is based on blood relations and an adopted child cannot become a chief.  Africans are 
conservative and the socialization process reinforces the perception that persons in same-
sex relationships are deviants. Even where same-sex relationships have been alleged to 
have existed, people engaging in the act could not be open about it.244 In some cases, 
native custom dictated punishment for attempted sodomy.245 In addition, the overtly 
homophobic attitudes and policies of many African states cast doubt on the acceptance of 
homosexuality in Africa. The current trend of legislation and public abhorrence of 




3. Same-sex regulation in Africa 
 
The recognition of same-sex marriage in Africa has been fueled, particularly, by 
the many anti-same-sex legislations enacted by some African countries. While some 
states explicitly prohibit homosexuality and other forms of same-sex unions, others lack 
any express prohibition on homosexual activity but have statutes that establish de facto 
criminalization/prohibition of gay and lesbian activities.246 The legislative attitudes of 
most African countries portray gay and lesbian rights as domestically unrecognized. 
                                                 
244 Marc Eprecht, Homosexual “Crime” in Early Colonial Zimbabwe” in Stephen O. Murray & Will 
Roscoe, eds, Boy-wives and female husbands: studies in African Homosexualities (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1998) at 197-221. 
245Ibid at 197. 
246 In Ghana, a person who has unnatural carnal knowledge of another person commits a misdemeanor. 
“Unnatural carnal knowledge” is defined to involve sexual intercourse with a person in an unnatural 
manner (see Ghana: Criminal Act, 1960 (Act 29), ss. 99 and 104. See also South Sudan: Penal Code Act, 
2008 (No. 9), s. 248). 
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From a conflict of laws perspective, this also raises the issue whether any recognition will 
be given to rights and obligations conferred on same-sex couples by foreign laws.  
Domestically, the recognition of homosexual rights has received an unwelcome 
attitude from most African countries. It is known that homosexuality is illegal in thirty-
five African countries, and six additional countries have banned male homosexual 
activity.247 There are only fifteen African countries that have not explicitly barred 
homosexuality by law. These are Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-
Bissau, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Madagascar, the Central African Republic, Chad, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Republic of the Congo, 
Mozambique.248 In Nigeria, Zambia, Gambia and Uganda, same-sex marriage/union is 
explicitly prohibited.249 Essentially, South Africa is the only African country which 
currently allows same-sex marriage under its Civil Union Act, 2006.  
Going through the length and breadth of the various anti-homosexual statutes in 
Africa, it is not difficult to see public hostility towards homosexuality. The law on the 
matter reflects the revulsion felt by the majority of people in Africa. This revulsion and 
disdain for homosexual activity is reflected in a number of statutes.  In 2009, Uganda 
proposed to increase criminal penalties not just for those who engage in homosexual acts, 
but also to criminalize activities in civil society that “aid and abet” homosexuality.250 
This proposal had significant social and political consequences both inside and outside of 
Uganda. The World Bank, for instance, postponed a $90 million loan to Uganda’s health 
                                                 
247 Adam J. Kretz, “From “Kill the Gays” to “Kill the Gay Rights Movement”: The Future of 
Homosexuality Legislation in Africa” (2013) 11:2 Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 
207 at 210. 
248Ibid at 210. 
249 In addition, there are countries which have legislation which could be interpreted as prohibiting same-
sex marriage. See in general Kenya, The Marriage Act, 2014, Ghana: Marriage Act, 1884-1985(CAP 127). 
250  Uganda, The Anti-Homosexuality Act, 2014. 
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system.251 Although the bill was initially suspended, the government passed into law the 
Uganda Anti-Homosexuality Act in 2014.252 Under the Act, a person was deemed to have 
committed an offence if: 
 (a) he penetrates the anus or mouth of another person of the same-sex 
with his penis or any other sexual contraption; 
(b) he or she uses any object or sexual contraption to penetrate or 
stimulate the sexual organ of a person of the same-sex; 
(c) he or she touches another person with the intention of committing 
the act of homosexuality.253 
 
The definition of homosexuality thus covered physical sexual activity that did not 
just necessarily culminate in intercourse, but encompassed anything which may include 
the touching of another’s penis or anus.254 The Act also made room for the persecution of 
anyone who was deemed to have sexual affection or expresses interest in a person of the 
same-sex.255 It included the prohibition of same-sex marriage.256 The Act allowed those 
convicted of homosexuality to be imprisoned for life.257 Although the Ugandan 
Constitutional Court has declared the Act unconstitutional,258 the public support that 
welcomed the Act reflects the attitude of most Ugandans, and Africans as a whole, 
towards homosexuality. 
                                                 
251 The position taken by the World Bank was criticized by many, with some political figures describing it 
as “bullying mentality”. The late President of Ghana, Prof. Atta Mills, was quoted as saying that he “will 
never initiate or support any attempt to legalize homosexuality in Ghana,"(Ghana Refuses to Grant Gays’ 
Rights Despite Aid Threat, BBC AFRICA (Nov. 2, 2011) http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-
15558769. 
252 The Constitutional Court of Uganda declared the Anti-Homosexuality Act as unconstitutional. However, 
the Court based its decision on the fact that the law was not properly passed due to the absence of quorum 
in parliament at the time of its passage. It is still uncertain whether the content of the Act violates the 
human rights provisions of the Ugandan Constitution (see in general J Oloka.Onyango & Others v Attorney 
General, Constitutional Petition NO. 08 of 2014)  
253Supra note 250, s 2. 
254Supra note 250, s 1.  
255Supra note 250, s 2(2). 
256Supra note 250, s 12. 
257Supra note 250, s 2(2). 
258 See J Oloka.Onyango & Others v Attorney General, Constitutional Petition NO. 08 of 2O14. See also 




Nigeria recently enacted the Same-sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act, 2013. The Act 
prohibits a marriage contract or civil union entered into between persons of the same-sex, 
solemnization of same, and for related matters. It is expressly stated that only a marriage 
contracted between a man and a woman shall be recognized as valid in Nigeria.259 The 
Act not only prohibits same-sex marriage, it also makes it an offence for the registration 
of gay clubs, societies and organizations, their sustenance, processions and meetings.260 
The position in Nigeria and Uganda reflects the legislative sentiment towards gay and 
lesbian rights in Africa. In addition to these two countries, Tanzania also allows for life 
imprisonment of an individual who is convicted of same-sex activity.261 In Zambia, a 
marriage between persons of the same-sex is void. Under section 27(1)(c) of the 
Matrimonial Causes Act, 2007, a marriage shall be void if the parties to the marriage are 
of the same-sex.262 
In addition to these explicit prohibitions, some states have put legislation in place 
which could be interpreted to constitute de facto prohibition against recognition of gay 
and lesbian rights. In Ghana, for example, unnatural carnal knowledge is a criminal 
offence; even if the act is between consenting adults.263 While the country’s Criminal Act 
does not explicitly say that homosexuality is illegal, it seems the section can be 
interpreted to include homosexuality.  
As well, Kenya’s Penal Code criminalizes sodomy.  Under this Code, a “person 
who … has carnal knowledge of any person against the order of nature … or permits a 
                                                 
259Nigeria: Same-sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act, 2013, s 3. 
260Ibid, ss 4, 5.  
261 Tanzania, Sexual Offences Special Provisions Act, 1998, sec. 154(1)(c). 
262 Zambia, The Matrimonial Causes Act2007, s 27(1)(c). 
263 Unnatural carnal Knowledge is defined as “sexual intercourse with a person in an unnatural manner or 
with an animal” (see, generally, Criminal Act, 1960 (ACT 29), s 104). 
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male person to have carnal knowledge of him or her against the order of nature” commits 
a felony, punishable on conviction by a fourteen year prison term.264 The phrase “against 
the order of nature” has been defined as “sexual intercourse or copulation between man 
or woman of the same-sex, or either of them with a beast”.265   It is also termed 
“buggery”, a crime against nature, an abominable and detestable crime against nature, an 
unspeakable crime.266 Although there is no express mention of homosexuality in the Act, 
the courts have interpreted the phrase “against the order of nature” to imply the 
prohibition of homosexual activities.267 
Alongside the criminalization of homosexual activities are statutes which 
expressly define marriage as a union between a man and a woman- which then implicitly 
excludes same-sex unions. In Kenya, marriage is the voluntary union of a man and a 
woman whether in a monogamous or polygamous union.268 The language of the Kenyan 
Marriage Act almost exactly mirrors the anti-same-sex laws enacted in Nigeria.269 
It is important to mention that while attempts are being made to criminalize same-
sex relationships, there have been some movement towards positively receiving them. 
For example, in May 2012, Malawi’s new President, Joyce Banda, expressed her 
intention to scrap the laws criminalizing homosexuality.270 Also, some states legalize 
                                                 
264  Kenya, Penal Codeof 1930, s 162. 
265Ali Abdi Shabura v Republic [2012] eKLR. 
266Ibid. 
267 Section 148 of the Penal Code, 1991 of Sudan also states that: any man who inserts his penis or its 
equivalent into a woman’s or a man’s anus or permits another man to insert his penis or its equivalent in his 
anus is said to have committed sodomy… and shall be punished with flogging by one hundred lashes and 
he shall also be liable to five years’ imprisonment. 
268 Kenya, The Marriage Act, 2014, s 3. 
269 Section 3 of Nigeria’s Same-sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act, provides that only marriage contracted 
between a man and a woman shall be recognized as valid in Nigeria. 




same-sex sexual activity between two women.271 In South Africa, civil unions in the form 
of marriage or civil partnerships are permitted by law. The co-existence of these different 
regimes creates a complex web of legal issues from a conflict of laws perspective. It is 
debatable whether the current laws in some African states seek to invalidate even the 
rights and obligations that are recognized by other countries. Nigeria explicitly prohibits 
recognition of foreign same-sex marriage even if the marriage has been validly contracted 
under a foreign law.272 However, other African countries have statutes that are purely 
domestic and do not address international same-sex relationship cases. It can, however, 
be argued that the domestic law reflects domestic public policy which may become 
relevant in international cases. 
 
4. Conflict of Laws Aspects of same-sex marriage in Africa 
 
The debate for the recognition of same-sex marriage in Africa has mainly focused 
on whether particular states should or should not recognize such relationships. One of the 
major issues which have been ignored is the conflict of laws which arise from the 
recognition/non-recognition of such unions. That is, how should such relationships be 
handled in cross-border situations? For example, will a same-sex marriage that had been 
celebrated in Canada be recognized in Ghana? Will the adopted child of a Nigerian same-
sex couple who resides in the UK be allowed to inherit their parent’s estate in Nigeria? 
Can an American same-sex couple adopt from Malawi?  
In Nigeria, a marriage contract or civil union entered into between persons of 
thesame-sex by virtue of a certificate issued by a foreign country is void, and “any benefit 
                                                 
271 In Kenya, woman-to-woman marriage is recognized among the Naadi people and also celebrated under 
Kikuyu customary marriages laws. The practice is also recognized among the Lovedu tribe in South Africa. 
272Supra note 259, s 1(2). 
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accruing there-from by virtue of the certificate shall not be enforced by any court of 
law”.273 Nigeria seems to be the first country on the African continent to enact anti-same-
sex legislation having extra-territorial effects. Given the prevalence of anti-same-sex 
statutes in Africa, the question is whether these provisions create a blanket non-
recognition of gay and lesbian rights. Indeed, the nature of conflict of laws is such that 
even countries that do not formally allow institutionalization of same-sex relationships 
may be confronted with the challenge of dealing with it in a conflict of laws scenarios. 
The next subsections look at various conflict of laws issues which may arise from 
the recognition/non-recognition of same-sex marriage in Africa and how these countries 
may approach the various private international law issues that may arise before their 
courts in respect to same-sex unions, irrespective of whether there is legislation on the 
subject. In trying to proffer solutions to the problems identified, the section will draw on 
comparative legislation and jurisprudence from the UK, South Africa and Canada – three 
countries that have addressed some of the issues and which were examined in Chapters 




Let us consider the following scenario: a Ugandan national A domiciled in 
Canada, enters into a civil same-sex marriage in Canada with B, a Ghanaian resident in 
Canada. Upon the intestacy of A, how will the Ugandan court devolve the properties of A 
situated in Uganda? 
                                                 
273Supra note 259, s 1(2). The Act further provides that “only a marriage contracted between a man and a 
woman shall be recognized as valid in Nigeria” (section 3). 
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In the case above, the kind of blanket rule of non-recognition, analogous to that 
proposed under section 1(2) of Nigeria Same-sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act, is illogical 
and may create unfair results. In Uganda, the choice of law rule in cases involving 
succession is that immovable properties are governed by the law of the place where the 
properties are situated, and the laws of place of domicile of the deceased governs the 
movables.274 Thus, succession to the immovable property in Uganda of a person deceased 
is regulated by the law of Uganda, wherever that person may have had his or her domicile 
at the time of his or her death.275 
In Nigeria, it has been stated that the lex situs i.e. law of Nigeria, including its 
conflict of laws rules governs succession to immovables.276 In the Ghana case of 
Youhana v. Abboud277 where two Lebanese, domiciled in Lebanon, died intestate leaving 
immovable properties in Ghana, the court held that the devolution of the properties 
should be governed by the lex situs. In the scenario given, B must not only prove the 
existence of a valid marriage between him and A, but must also prove that he qualified as 
a spouse under the applicable law. Under the intestate succession law of Uganda, a 
“husband” means a person who at the time of the intestate’s death was (i) validly married 
to the deceased according to the laws of Uganda; or (ii) married to the deceased in 
another country by a marriage recognized as valid by any foreign law under which the 
marriage was celebrated.278 Thus, the burden on B is to prove that the marriage to A was 
valid under the laws of Canada.  Given that B’s relationship with A is recognized under 
                                                 
274 Oppong, supra note 72 at 294. 
275Succession Act, 1906 (Chapter 162), s 4. 
276  Oppong, supra note 72 at 290-295. 
277 [1974] 2 GLR 201. 
278Supra note 275, s 2. 
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Canadian law as valid, the question arises whether the court will recognize the 
relationship of A and B, not-withstanding that Uganda prohibits same-sex marriage.  
A strict interpretation of Uganda’s Succession Act will thus entitle B to inherit  
A’s properties since the Canadian marriage is “a marriage recognized as valid by the 
foreign law under which the marriage was celebrated”. Any other interpretation will 
make the current provision under the Succession Act inconsistent with the Anti-
Homosexuality Act, 2014. Until the legislature clarifies what constitutes “foreign 
marriage” under the Succession Act, arguments can be made that the courts may 
recognize foreign same-sex marriages for the purposes of succession where any such 
marriage has been validly celebrated under the foreign law. Any other interpretation of 
the section to deny recognition of a foreign same-sex marriage will not only create 
absurdity, but will also lead to injustice in light of the couple having acquired property 
together.279 
Such absurdity and injustice was evident during the era of blanket non-
recognition of certain domestic unions by the common law courts. As has already been 
mentioned, under common law, a marriage that is void ab initio produces none of the 
legal incidents of marriage and the parties do not succeed to each other ab intestato.280 
Essentially, a void marriage has no legal effect on the parties and can be treated as never 
having existed. However, issues relating to the recognition of “invalid” marriages for the 
                                                 
279 Under section 32 if there is no person existing or reasonably ascertainable entitled to take any part of the 
property of an intestate, that part or the whole, as the case may be, shall belong to the State. 
280  Hahlo, supra note 178 at 487. 
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purposes of an incidental remedy have been addressed in jurisdictions like the UK and 
Canada, and also under different concepts such as that of the putative marriage. 
 In regard to same-sex marriage, Hammerle has emphasized thatthe reasoning 
used by courts to recognize "invalid" marriages can be extended by analogy to include 
same-sex marriages or civil unions for purposes of intestacy.281 This has been the solution 
proffered in Canada and the UK to recognize unions that would be invalid if celebrated in 
the two jurisdictions. In Cheni v. Cheni and Haussain v Haussain the English courts 
respectively assumed jurisdiction in a union falling under the prohibited degree of 
consanguinity and a polygamous marriage. In addition, the Matrimonial Proceedings 
(Polygamous Marriages) Act, 1972, represents a benevolent approach towards the 
recognition of polygamous marriages celebrated by foreign individuals but such unions 
are considered to be domestically invalid in the UK. This is to provide remedy in cases 
where the blanket non-recognition of such unions will lead to unjust results. In Haussain, 
for example, the court did not allow the husband to rely on the polygamous nature of his 
marriage to defeat the claim for a decree of judicial separation.  In the Canadian case of 
Azam v Jan,282 the court took jurisdiction over a foreign polygamous marriage on public 
policy grounds.283 It acknowledged the marriage for the limited purpose of providing an 
adequate remedy although the court was satisfied that whatever its foreign legality, it is 
invalid in Canada.  
                                                 
281 Christine A. Hammerle, “Free Will to Will? A Case For The Recognition of Intestacy Rights for 
Survivors to A Same-Sex Marriage or Civil Union” (2005-2006)104:7 Michigan Law Review 1763 at 
1773. 
282Azam v. Jan 2013 ABQB 301 at para 59. 
283In the opinion of Bielby, J.A “taking jurisdiction to grant a divorce of an actively polygamous marriage 
does not logically compel the recognition of polygamous marriages entered into in Canada or other 
jurisdictions in which they are illegal, nor mandate the expansion of Canadian immigration law or policy to 
admit parties to such marriages as immigrants to Canada” (see Azam v Jan, 2012 ABCA 197 at para 23). 
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The issue of succession has been one of the many areas a Canadian or UK court 
may recognize as valid, a union which cannot be entered into in the two countries. In Yew 
v. Attorney-General of British Columbia,284 the court recognized both wives of a 
polygamous marriage and held that they are entitled to the benefits extended to wives 
under the Succession Duty Act.285 The non-recognition of the marriage would have meant 
that the testator's two wives, admittedly lawfully married in China to the testator and 
throughout his life, would have been without a remedy.286 As McPhillips J.A. rightly 
noted, this would be contrary to natural justice.287 
In addition to judicial intervention to remedy the injustice that result from blanket 
non-recognition, provincial legislation has also provided remedy to cure such results that 
may flow from situations like in the scenario above.288  For example, the Ontario Family 
Law Act289 has been interpreted to include parties who have undergone a marriage 
ceremony or event in good faith but did not have the capacity to enter into the marriage 
(e.g. by reason of prohibited degrees of consanguinity) and, parties to a voidable 
marriage, as well as spouses to a polygamous marriage.290 In the context of same-sex 
marriage and from an African perspective, this will include the extension of family law 
benefits to same-sex couples as pertained to heterosexual couples. In South Africa it has 
                                                 
284 [1923] 33 B.C.R. 109. 
285 [1911] Cap. 21i, R.S.B.C.  
286 The “incident of marriage approach” has also been used in a number of US cases to grant benefit of 
inheritance through intestacy as a single, recognizable incident of marriage although the recognition of the 
marriage was prohibited under State laws. It has been stated that in Miller v. Lucks, 36 So, 2d 140 (Miss, 
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the court in Inre Dalip Singh Bir's Estate, 188 P.2d 499 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948) recognized intestacy 
rights for an unlawful polygamous marriage. See in general Hammerle, supra note 44 at 1775-1778. 
287Yew v. Attorney-General of British Columbia at 137. 
288 Alberta, Family Law Act, SA 2003, c F-4.5. 
289RSO 1990, c F.3. 
290Hicks v Gallardo,2013 ONSC 129. 
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been held that the word “marriage” in s 3 of the Divorce Act must be read to include 
registered foreign same-sex marriages or civil unions/partnerships which are lawful in the 
country in which they are concluded.291 In essence, any ancillary or pendente lite relief 
contemplated under the Divorce Act is available to same-sex partners.292It must, however, 
be mentioned that the extension of such benefits to couples involved in an invalid 
marriage does not confer on individuals domiciled in the country the right to enter into 
such unions. The recognition is for the limited purpose under the Act. 
Ideally, universal recognition of same-sex marriage will avoid the conflict of laws 
aspect of succession as it relates to such marriages. However, the public policy of 
countries differ significantly. Short of recognition, English-speaking African countries 
can recognize such relationships when the question has to do with inheritance. In this 
case, the court is not being called upon to recognize or sanction the relationship during 




In a different scenario, A, a Ghanaian national domiciled in Canada, enters into a 
civil union in South Africa with B, a Nigerian resident of Canada. The couple adopts C as 
their son underSouth Africa’s adoption laws. Upon the death intestate of A and B, how 
                                                 
291AS v CS, 2011 (2) SA 360 at371. 
292  Before the enactment of the Civil Union Act the Constitutional Court has held in the case of Gory v 
Kolver and Others,  2007 (4) SA 97,  that partners in a permanent same-sex life partnership should be 
regarded as “spouses” for intestate succession purposes.   
293 Where only the question of inheritance/succession is involved, it is debatable if a country’s 'public 
policy' is affected. 
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will the courts in Nigeria treat C for the purposes of the devolution of A’s properties in 
Nigeria?  
This scenario illustrates the cross-border issues which may arise from 
international adoption. In jurisdictions like Nigeria where same-sex marriage is expressly 
prohibited and gay and lesbians rights curtailed, it can be argued that gays and lesbians 
do not have the right to adopt a child by reason of their sexual orientation.294 Other 
jurisdictions provide equal adoption regimes for both same-sex couples and heterosexual 
couples. The South African Children’s Act provides for adoption of a child by partners in 
a permanent domestic life partnership or whose permanent domestic life-partner is the 
parent of the child.295 In general, an adoption order confers full parental responsibilities 
and rights in respect to the adopted child onto the adoptive parent.  Under the Children’s 
Act of South Africa, the adopted child, for all purposes, is regarded as the child of the 
adoptive parent, and an adoptive parent is, for all purposes, regarded as the parent of the 
adopted child.296 
Thus, in the case above, C is treated, for all purposes, as the child of A and B in 
South Africa.297 In Kenya, an adoption order made by any court of competent jurisdiction 
shall be recognized by its courts.298 Given that Kenya is also party to the Hague 
Convention on the Protection of Children and Co-Operation in Respect of Inter-Country 
Adoption, 1993, it is debatable whether Kenya can use the non-recognition of same-sex 
                                                 
294 Nigeria’s Child’s Rights Act of 2003 provides that an adoption order may be in favor of a married 
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Rights Act 2003, s 129.  
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unions to refuse the incident of adoption that may flow from such a union. Although it is 
not explicitly stated in the adoption laws of Nigeria that same-sex persons may not adopt, 
the many laws in Nigeria that criminalize same-sex activities may support the assertion 
that the country does not recognize the rights of homosexuals to adopt, and by extension 
same-sex couples.299 The question arises whether the courts will recognize C as the 
legitimate child of A and B for the purposes of succession. 
Nigerian adoption laws vary from state to state. In general, there is a combination 
of residency and age requirements, as well as the requirement of married couples to adopt 
jointly. Most of the legislation in the various states deals with domestic adoption. At 
present, no Nigerian legislation deals with the private international law issues which 
could potentially arise in adoption proceedings.300 As Oppong rightly noted, this is 
remarkable, since there are a number of issues that may arise where it may be necessary 
for a court to decide whether or not to recognize a foreign adoption order.301 The 
determination of the rights of an adopted child to inherit from his adoptive parents 
squarely falls into one of these issues. In the absence of a statutory regime for recognising 
foreign adoption orders, it is doubtful whether Nigeria will apply the English common 
law rule on the recognition of foreign adoption in the context of same-sex couples.302 
Essentially, this will give C the status of a child and the right to inherit to the properties 
of A and B. The blanket rule of non-recognition, analogous to that proposed under section 
                                                 
299See, for example,Child’s Right Act, 2003, (CAP 2003) s 129 (d). But see also the Nigerian Criminal 
Code, 1990 (Chapter 77) s 217 and the Same-sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act. 
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of Inter-country Adoption, 1993. 
301  Oppong, supra note 72 at 231.  
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of the adoption, domiciled in the country where the adoption was effected. In Re Valentine's Settlement, 
[1965] 1 Ch 831 the Court of Appeal refused to recognize a South African adoption on the basis that at the 
time the adoptive father was resident in Southern Rhodesia. It was stated that questions of status were 
dependent on domicile. 
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1(2) of the Same-sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act, 2013, will be irrational and may create 
unjust results. These are practical issues which should be of concern to African nations 
contemplating the recognition/non-recognition of same-sex marriage. In the absence of 
any legislation, Oppong has recommended that, generally, an adoption order made in a 
jurisdiction where the child was resident, a national or domiciled should be recognized.303 
Though this seems to cover every situation, it appears Oppong did not consider the issues 
which could potentially arise from cross-border adoption relating to homosexuality and 
the new trend of legislation recommending blanket non-recognition of homosexual rights 
in Africa. This notwithstanding, the position recommended by Oppong could be 
generally applied to adoption involving both opposite sex and same-sex couples.304 The 
best interest of the child should be paramount in all adoption-related decisions and the 
fact that the child “did not have the will to choose his/her own parents” should not be 
ignored.305  In Canada, it has been said that the courts will give effect to an adoption 
order and the effect that flows from it if it complies with the laws of the place in which it 
was ordered.306This will ensure that the adoption orders which are considered valid in the 
originating state (the state where the order was made) are recognized in all countries. 
Related to the issue of adoption is the legitimacy of the children of same-sex 
marriages, especially lesbians. What is the legal status of children raised by same-sex 
couples? Are these children legitimate or illegitimate? Which law determines the 
legitimacy of such children?  
                                                 
303 Oppong, supra note 72. 
304 In Re Valentine's Settlement, [1965] 1 Ch 831 Lord Denning reasoned that in the interest of comity of 
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domiciled there and the child is resident there. 
305 Carissa Trast, “You Can't Choose Your Parents: Why Children Raised by Same-Sex Couples are 
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The legitimacy of the children that may come out of a same-sex marriage has not 
received much attention in most English-speaking African countries. In Nigeria the 
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child is determined by the laws of the country in which its 
parents are domiciled at the time of the child’s birth.307 This also seems to be the position 
in Ghana, Kenya and South Africa, where the courts of domicile of the child or the 
domicile of the applicant have jurisdiction to declare whether a child is legitimate.308 It is 
debatable whether the use of the word “parents” covers same-sex couples.  The fact that 
some of these children may not be biologically related to their parents raises the question 
whether such children are legitimate to inherit from the “other parent”? In a case where A 
is the life partner of B and C is the biological child of only B, and not A, the question is 
whether C can inherit from A on the death intestate of A. In this case, unless there is a 
formal adoption, A is a legal stranger to C and C has no right to inherit from the non-
biological parent, A.309 Going by the conflict of laws rules which have been used to 
determine the issue of legitimacy of children as applied in Nigeria, Ghana and Kenya,C 
would be considered an illegitimate child if the parents are domiciled in any of above 
countries. This is more so given the blanket non-recognition of same-sex relationships as 
proposed in these countries. The non-recognition of this relationship will mean that C 
would be denied the right to inherit from A irrespective of the fact that A would probably 
have expected C to recover from her estate. However, as Trast rightly said “children born 
to same-sex parents should not suffer legal disadvantages simply because society may not 
                                                 
307Bamgbose v Daniel, [1952-5] 14 WACA 111. Also stated in Oppong, supra note 72 at 246. 
308 Oppong, supra note 72 at 245-251. 
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approve of their parents' way of life. To withhold this benefit and protection from these 




Another area where the strict application of blanket non-recognition of same-sex 
marriage may lead to absurdity and unjust results is of re-marriage.311A, a Ghanaian 
domiciled in Ghana enters into a same-sex marriage in Canada with B, a Canadian 
domiciled. A subsequently visits Ghana and purports to enter into a civil marriage with C. 
Can B(or anyone) enter a caveat to stop the marriage on the basis that he is already 
married to A under the Civil Marriage Act of Canada? If the marriage is entered into, can 
A be charged with the offence of bigamy? 
In Ghana a marriage is invalid when either of the parties, at the time of the 
celebration of the marriage, is married under an applicable law to a person other than the 
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emphasized by the Ontario Superior Court in V & L v. Attorney General of Canada (05 April 2011), 
Ottawa 11/367893 (Ont Superior Court) marriage and divorce is a central component of the freedom to live 
life with the mate of one's choice.  A declination of jurisdiction will mean that the parties are prevented 
from severing the legal and psychological bonds of marriage in a way that other couples routinely take for 
granted. In such a case, the court has to re-characterize the marriage as a valid marriage under the laws of 
Ghana and assume jurisdiction.  
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person with whom the marriage is celebrated.312 This also seems to be the position in 
Kenya where a union is not a marriage if at the time of the making of the union either 
party is incompetent to marry by reason of a subsisting marriage.313 Essentially, under 
most marriage laws in Africa, a marriage is not valid when either of the parties thereto at 
the time of the celebration of such marriage is “married” to another person.314Thus, the 
subsistence of a valid marriage constitutes a valid impediment against any of the parties’ 
to contract another marriage.  
In re Clara Sackitey,315 the Ghanaian court found that the applicant and the 
respondent were validly married under customary law. Under the circumstances, the 
court held that until the first marriage is dissolved, the respondent cannot validly marry 
any other woman under the provisions of the Marriage Ordinance except the applicant. 
The position is also supported by the Ghana Court of Appeal case of Ruth Arthur v John 
Hector Ansah & Naomi Owusu,316 where it was held that the Ordinance Marriage 
celebrated between the first and second defendants was unlawful and of no effect in the 
light of the existing customary marriage subsisting between the plaintiff and first 
defendant which has not been dissolved. It can be inferred from the cases that the 
invalidity of the second marriage arose from the subsistence of the previous marriage and 
hence the validity of the previous marriage. In re Clara Sackitey, the court allowed the 
applicant to caveat against the celebration of the ordinance marriage because of the 
existence of a valid customary marriage between the applicant and the respondent. 
                                                 
312 Ghana: Marriage Act, 1884-1985, s 74. 
313Supra note 268, s 11(1)c. 
314 See generally Marriage Act, 1990 (Chapter 218), ss 33, 39.  
315Re Caveat By Clara Sackitey: Re Marriage Ordinance, CAP 127, [1962] 1 GLR 180. 
316[31/7/2003] Civil Appeal NO. 62/2002. 
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However, where the purported first marriage was void, the validity of the subsequent 
marriage cannot be questioned on the basis of the void marriage. In the Kenyan case of H 
N N v M N & Another,317the appellant averred that her marriage with the first respondent 
was valid and still subsisted, and that the first respondent could not lawfully undergo a 
church wedding with the second respondent whilst the first marriage still subsisted. The 
court, however, found on evidence that there was no valid marriage between the appellant 
and the first respondent to constitute a bar to the respondent entering into another 
marriage.318 Accordingly, the first respondent had the capacity to perform the marriage 
ceremony with the second respondent. 
In Ghana, a person who, knowing that a marriage subsists between him/her and 
any person, goes through the ceremony of marriage, whether in Ghana or elsewhere, with 
some other person commits the offence of bigamy.319This provision suggests that the 
previous marriage must be valid in order for the offence of bigamy to be committed.320 In 
Nigeria, it is an offence punishable by five years’ imprisonment for a person to go 
through a ceremony of marriage with a person whom he or she knows to be married to 
another person.321 The offence of bigamy is thus founded on the issue whether there was 
a prior subsisting marriage between one of the parties and a third person. 
                                                 
317 [2009] eKLR. 
318H N N v M N & Another, [2009] eKLR. 
319 Ghana, Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29), ss 262-263. Section 264 also makes it an offence for any person 
who, being unmarried, goes through the ceremony of marriage, whether in Ghana or elsewhere, with a 
person whom he or she knows to be married to another person. 
320 It must, however, be stated that the subsequent marriage contracted under customary law will not 
constitute bigamy if the first marriage had also been contracted under customary law. Under section 265 of 
the Criminal Code a person is not guilty of bigamy if the marriage in respect of which the act was 
committed, and the former marriage, were both contracts under customary law. 
321Supra note 314, s 39. 
102 
 
From the scenario above, B must prove that there was a valid marriage between 
him and A, and that the said marriage still subsists. In the context of Nigeria, B’s 
marriage to A under the Civil Marriage Act is invalid. The Same-sex Marriage 
(Prohibition) Act, does not recognize the said marriage for any purpose. A strict 
application of the Act will mean that B has no capacity to file a caveat against the 
proposed marriage between A and C, since in the eyes of the law, A has not entered into 
any marriage.322 That is, in this particular case, there is a prior subsisting marriage 
according to Canadian law, but according to the conflict of laws and domestic laws of 
Nigeria, there is no such prior marriage. A fortiori, A cannot be charged with the offence 
of bigamy since the previous marriage for which the offence is determined is held to be 
invalid.  
Similarly, in a country like Kenya where marriage is defined as a union between a 
man and a woman, it seems the capacity of A to enter into a subsequent marriage cannot 
be questioned on the basis of the Canadian marriage. In this case A, can argue that the 
same-sex marriage was not regarded as marriage in Kenya, and that he was, therefore, 
legally, a single person. The effect of the blanket non-recognition of A’s marriage to B is 
that the civil marriage will still subsist under Canadian conflict of laws and the second 
marriage between A and C will be void. The converse will be the position in Nigeria the 
second marriage between A and C will be valid and the civil marriage between A and B 
will be void. This is more so since Nigeria will not recognize the Canadian marriage and, 
thus, will not grant divorce.323 Thus, from a conflict of laws perspective, A would be 
                                                 
322 In a different but related context see H N N v M N & Another, supra note 318. 
323 It is debatable whether it can be argued that the first marriage is automatically terminated the moment 
the second is celebrated. This seems to be the position adopted in South Africa internal conflict of laws in 
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validly married under two laws. But while A may be charged with bigamy under the laws 
of Canada, he may lawfully contract a valid marriage in Ghana, Nigeria and Kenya. As 
Koppelman has rightly noted, the position in Ghana, Nigeria and Kenya will lead to the 
situation where  
People in same-sex marriages could desert their dependents with 
impunity and, by crossing a border, free themselves of all obligations of 
marital property. They could even marry other people without telling 
those people about their still-existing marriages.324 
In contrast to the positions in Ghana, Nigeria and Kenya, in South Africa civil 
marriage is recognized. In this case, B can raise an objection to any proposed marriage 
between A and any other person on the basis that his marriage with A is valid and still 
subsists.325 The Canadian marriage will thus constitute a legal impediment to A’s 
subsequent marriage to any other person.  This will prevent the situation where A can be 
validly married under two separate legal regimes. However, the South African regime 
will also provide an avenue for A to divorce B if A intends to marry C. In AS v CS, the 
court concluded that a same-sex marriage or same-sex civil union is capable of 
dissolution under section 3 of the Divorce Act, 1979.326 As has already been mentioned, 
the word “marriage” in section 3 of the Divorce Act has been interpreted to include 
registered foreign same-sex marriages or civil unions/partnerships which are lawful in the 
country in which they are concluded.327 These provisions provide an avenue for A’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
the context of polygamous marriage.  It has been mentioned that the polygamous marriage is ipso facto 
dissolved where either party in a potentially polygamous marriage under customary law subsequently 
concludes a monogamous marriage with someone else (under Roman-Dutch law)( see T. C. Hartley, 
“Bigamy in the Conflict of Laws” (1967)16 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 680 at 693). 
324  Koppelman, supra note 201 at xiii. 
325 South Africa, Marriage Act,1961, s 23.  
326AS v CS 2011 (2) SA 360 at 366. 
327Ibid at 371. 
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marriage under the Civil Marriage Act to be divorced in South Africa under the Divorce 
Act, 1979.  
These cases illustrate possible conflict of laws issues which may arise from the 
recognition/non-recognition of same-sex marriage in the context of re-marriage. The 
cases illustrate that a refusal to recognize a same-sex marriage could cause substantial 
hardship and injustice to individuals. A rule of blanket non-recognition has the 
consequence of leading to multiple marriages, and a situation where a valid same-sex 
marriage produces no legal effect when one party crosses to a state that does not 
recognize such unions.  In countries where a blanket rule of non-recognition of practicing 
same-sex persons’ rights exist, this level of injustice may occur unless the courts are 
ready to recognize the marriage for limited purposes, while still refusing to recognize the 




One area in which blanket non-recognition of same-sex marriage will lead to an 
unjustifiable result is in the exercise of jurisdiction in matrimonial causes. For example, 
A, a Ghanaian national domiciled in Nigeria, enters into a civil marriage with B, a 
national of South Africa. A later deserts B and settles in his country of domicile, Nigeria. 
Can B petition a court in Nigeria or Ghana for divorce? Alternatively, can A institute 
matrimonial proceedings in Nigeria or Ghana for a decree of nullity of the marriage? 
Whether a court has jurisdiction, or, alternatively, can assume jurisdiction over 
matrimonial causes is tied to the legal system of each country. Matrimonial actions may 
arise in cases of divorce, nullity of marriage, judicial separation, presumption of death 
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and dissolution of marriage. In general, the court exercising jurisdiction must have a 
connection to the parties of the action. In most cases, the primary question is whether or 
not the parties have connection with the territorial area over which the court has exercised 
its jurisdiction. Factors such as domicile, nationality and residency are some of the main 
considerations that are involved in determining the issue. In Ghana, the connecting 
factors in matrimonial causes are determined under section 31 of the Matrimonial Causes 
Act. A court may have jurisdiction when either party to the marriage is a citizen of 
Ghana, domiciled in Ghana or has been ordinarily a resident in Ghana for at least three 
years immediately preceding the commencement of the proceedings.328 Essentially, a 
party must be able to establish one of these connecting factors for the courts to accept 
jurisdiction.  
The position in Ghana is similar to the regime in South Africa. In South Africa, a 
court can exercise divorce jurisdiction if either of the parties are domiciled in the area of 
the court on the date of which the action is instituted, or is ordinarily a resident in the area 
of jurisdiction of the court on the said date, or has been ordinarily a resident in South 
Africa for a period of not less than one year immediately prior to that date.329 
Significantly, the fact that one of the parties is a national of South Africa cannot, on its 
own, confer jurisdiction upon the court. This is contrary to the position in Ghana where 
nationality is considered to be a factor allowing the court to exercise matrimonial 
jurisdiction over the parties. A South African court may exercise matrimonial jurisdiction 
                                                 
328Supra note 311, s 31. 
329 South African, Divorce Act 1979, s. 2(1). It is worth mentioning that in South Africa, different rules 
apply with regard to other matrimonial proceedings aside from divorce, which is treated separately. In 
regards to a nullity suit, for example, it has been argued that the plaintiff may bring his action in any court 
he pleases. However, a court competent to hear a divorce case, at the same time, may hear other ancillary 
matters flowing from the divorce (see Hahlo, supra note 178 at 560-561). 
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over a foreign national domiciled in the country while refusing jurisdiction over one of its 
own nationals on the grounds that the person is not domiciled in or is a resident of the 
Republic. This is also the case in Nigeria, where proceedings for a decree of dissolution 
of marriage, judicial separation, nullity, restitution of conjugal rights, and jactitation of 
marriage may only be instituted by a person domiciled in Nigeria.330 The issue of 
domicile is thus a vital and germane condition allowing for the court to exercise 
jurisdiction.331 The fact that one of the parties to the proceedings is a resident of Nigeria, 
or a national of the country does not, in and of itself, provide a basis for the courts to 
exercise jurisdiction in matrimonial proceedings. However, in Kenya, domicile and 
residency are the main connecting factors, albeit, jurisdiction is exercised mainly in 
accordance with the law applied in matrimonial proceedings in the High Court in 
England.332 
Indeed, the use of domicile as a factor in matrimonial proceedings is one of the 
many influences that the English common law left in English-speaking African 
countries.333 Historically, under the common law, domicile was the main factor allowing 
a court to exercise jurisdiction in matrimonial proceedings.334 However, the common law 
position has been that the wife followed the husband’s domicile and in cases of an 
application for divorce, the court which has jurisdiction is that of which the husband was 
                                                 
330 Nigeria: Matrimonial Causes Act, 1990, s. 2(2). 
331 See generally Omtunda v Omotunda [2001] 9 NWLR 252. 
332Matrimonial Causes Act, 1941, ss 3, 4.   
333 Indeed, in Kenya, jurisdiction under the Matrimonial Causes Act is to be exercised in accordance with 
the law applied in matrimonial proceedings in the High Court of Justice in England (Matrimonial Causes 
Act, 1941, s 3). 
334See A. V. Dicey & J. H. C Morris, Dicey and Morris on Conflict of Laws, 13th ed vol 1 (London : Sweet 
& Maxwell, 200) at 107- 146. 
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domiciled at the time the action was instituted.335 The domicile of a married woman was 
thus tied to that of his husband.336 One problem with the wife’s domicile of dependency 
arose when the husband deserted her after the marriage and resides abroad.337 In this case, 
the strict application of the rule meant that the wife is unable to institute divorce 
proceedings in another jurisdiction. Instead, she must commence the proceedings in the 
jurisdiction in which the husband is domiciled. The effect was that a deserted wife would 
have remained bound to a marriage existing only in name. The rule was deemed 
discriminatory and combined with the potential injustices and hardships it may create, it 
                                                 
335 See South Africa: Matrimonial Causes Jurisdiction Act, 1939 (Act 22). See also E Schoeman, “The 
Abolition of the Wife’s Domicile of Dependency: A Lesson in History” (1995) 58 TSAR 488 at 489.  
336 This common law position has been amended in a number of countries. For example in Ghana, for the 
purposes of jurisdiction under the Matrimonial Causes Act, the domicile of a married woman is determined 
as if the woman was above the age of twenty-one and not married (Matrimonial Causes Act, s 32) 
337 It is worth mentioning that the common law rule of domicile of dependency has not been abolished in its 
entirety in some English-speaking African countries. In South Africa, for example, the proprietary rights of 
spouses and all their property, are governed by the laws of the husbands’ domicile at the time of the 
marriage. See generally Harry Silberberg, “The determination of matrimonial property rights and the 
doctrine of immutability in the conflict of laws” (1973) 6:3 Comp. & Int'l L.J. S. Afr. 323. In Frankel's 
Estate v. The Master, [1950] 1 S.A.L.R. 220, the sole issue was which law governed the proprietary 
consequences of the marriage - the matrimonial domicile or another domicile which the husband intends to 
acquire immediately or within a reasonable time after his marriage. The Appellate Division of the Supreme 
Court of South Africa decided in favor of the former, that, in the absence of express contract, the law of the 
domicile of the husband at the time of the marriage governs the matrimonial property. One advantage to 
these governing laws is the absolute certainty in every case as the ruling is consistently the same. Simply 
put, the laws of the husband’s domicile at the time of marriage are the laws which stand (See James H. 
George, “Matrimonial Domicile” (1950) 13 Mod. L. Rev.  883-884). However, many have questioned the 
propriety of the common law rule. In Sadiku v Sadiku (30498/06 (26-01-2007) (Unreported) Van Rooyen 
AJ questioned whether the categorical application of the lex domicillii of the husband is still acceptable 
within a gender equal society, such as South Africa. It has also been mentioned that the rule on a formal or 
abstract level, constitutes discrimination on the basis of gender, contrary to section 9(3) of the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa. In general see Jan L Neels & Marlene Wethmar-Lemmer, “Constitutional 
Values And The Proprietary Consequences Of Marriage In Private International Law- Introducing The Lax 
Causae Proprietis Matrimonii” (2008) 3 TSAR 587. From the perspective of conflict of laws, the common 
law rule will lead to absurd results and great anomaly if strictly applied in the context of same-sex 
marriages. How does one determine the domicile of same-sex partnerships? As has been mentioned, in 
heterosexual common law partnerships the wife takes on the domicile of the husband in marriage. How 
does the common law rule determine “the husband” in the same-sex context? In a same-sex marriage it is 
impossible to determine who the “husband” is and accordingly which legal system will regulate the 
proprietary consequences of the marriage. Given that marriage is defined as the lawful and voluntary union 
of two persons with no reference to wife (or husband), it is debatable whether the common law provision 
on the “wife’s domicile of dependency” can still be applied without apparent absurdity. Aside from the 
arguments of equality and discrimination, it is evident that the common law rule concerning the husband’s 
domicile at the time of the marriage needs critical reform if South Africa is to deal with property issues 
which may arise from the recognition of foreign same-sex marriages. 
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explains the basis for additional grounds of jurisdiction or departure from the common 
law rules on the exercise of matrimonial jurisdiction.338 
Accordingly, it can be seen that although there are differences in the provisions of 
the countries as to which factors  may connect a party to one country enabling the court 
to exercise jurisdiction, one clear factor, however, is that one of the parties having a 
connection to the country may be grounds enough for the court to assume jurisdiction. 
Although the issues of domicile and residency are arguably the two most 
contentious factors in the determination of jurisdiction in matrimonial causes, an exercise 
to analyze the determination of these two factors would be far beyond the scope of this 
section.339 Suffice it to say that residency and domicile are two perfectly distinct 
components, and long residency per se, although relevant, is rarely a deciding factor in 
determining domicile for the purposes of matrimonial proceedings.340 The fact that a 
Lebanese national with a Lebanese domicile of origin lived and worked in Ghana for 23 
years, had property in Ghana, had applied for Ghanaian citizenship, had applied for 
Ghanaian nationality for his son, and it was his intention that his son should take over his 
business in Ghana, were still not grounds enough for him to acquire a Ghanaian domicile 
of choice.341 A mere statement of intention to live in one country, without any supporting 
evidence of an intention to stay permanently, will not justify the acquisition of a new 
domicile of choice.342 
                                                 
338Hahlo, supra note 178 at 544. 
339 Nationality is a question of law but whether a person has acquired a domicile of choice or is a resident 
of a particular jurisdiction are questions of fact and are dependent upon the intention of the party. 
340 See Abu-Jaudeh v. Abu-Jaudeh, [1972] 2 GLR 444. 
341Ibid. 
342 See Amponsah v. Amponsah, [1997-1998] 1 GLR 43. 
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As is apparent from the above, the court, in exercising jurisdiction, does not 
consider the merits or otherwise of the cases. That is, jurisdiction over the subject matter 
is significantly different from whether the court has jurisdiction over the parties.343 The 
issue of matrimonial jurisdiction is basically whether one of the factors has been 
established so the parties over whom jurisdiction are exercised is deemed to be connected 
to the court which is assuming jurisdiction over them. In each case, the connecting factor 
must be established as condition precedent to confer jurisdiction on the court. In Schiratti 
v. Schiratti, the High Court in Nairobi refused to hear a petition for divorce filed by an 
Italian national who claimed to be domiciled in Kenya. In the considered opinion of the 
court, the petitioner failed to establish that he is domiciled in Kenya.344 However, 
whether a court may withhold jurisdiction on the basis of the subject matter regardless of 
the fact that there is a real and substantial connection to the parties has yet to be 
explored.345 
In the context of conflict of laws, and from the perspective of same-sex marriage, 
the provisions discussed on the exercise of matrimonial jurisdiction are instructive since 
they are not framed in terms of gender. In the scenario above, the burden placed upon the 
party who seeks to confer jurisdiction on the court is to establish that one of the parties is 
connected to the court on grounds of one or more of the connecting factors. In this case, 
matrimonial proceedings for nullity or divorce may be commenced in a Nigerian court, 
                                                 
343 Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the power of the court to hear the case, and the power to render a 
judgment on the merits and to grant relief (see generally Robert E. Oliphant, “Jurisdiction in Family Law 
Matters: The Minnesota Perspective” (2003) 30 WM. Mitchell L. Rev. 557 at 559-60. 
344Schiratti v. Schiratti, [1976-1980] 1 KLR 870. 
345 In the US, for example, it has been mentioned that courts in jurisdictions where same-sex marriage is 
prohibited have refused to grant divorce to same-sex couples on the ground that the court lacks subject-
matter jurisdiction to hear the matter (see Judith M Stinson, “The Right To (Same-Sex) Divorce” (2011-
2012) 62 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 447). See also Mary Patricia Byrn & Morgan L. Holcomb, “Wedlocked” 
(2012-2013) 67:1 U. Miami L. Rev. 1. 
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where A is domiciled, or a Ghanaian court, where A is a national. This position is 
supported by section 31 of the Matrimonial Causes Act of Ghana and section 2(2) of the 
Matrimonial Causes Act of Nigeria.  This should be the position, regardless of whether 
the two states either permit or, adversely, do not recognize same-sex marriages. The court 
should be able to exercise jurisdiction over the parties to declare the marriage void or a 
nullity. This is the case so far as the party is able to establish the prerequisites for the 
court to exercise jurisdiction.  
In the context of exercising jurisdiction over foreign polygamous marriages, 
Bielby J. has observed, obiter, in Azam v Jan, that even if the courts cannot terminate 
(i.e. by divorce) such a marriage, it is difficult to understand why a court should not be 
able to grant a declaration that an actively polygamous marriage is not recognized under 
Canadian law, including a declaration that it is a nullity here (if that were the law).346 In 
his opinion, if the courts clearly have jurisdiction to terminate foreign (monogamous) 
marriages, why should they not be able to terminate “all valid foreign marriages” if the 
parties otherwise meet the Canadian residential and other prerequisites to divorce?347 The 
plausible inference from Bielby J’s observation is that the court is clothed with 
jurisdiction in matrimonial causes so far as the prerequisites for exercising jurisdiction 
are satisfied. Indeed, the fact that the foreign marriage in question is not recognized in 
Canada is not grounds for the courts to refuse jurisdiction.348  These observations are very 
instructive in matrimonial causes involving same-sex couples who seek relief in a state 
which does not recognize same-sex marriages.  
                                                 
346 Supra note 167 at para 24. 
347Supra note 167 at para 18. 
348 This position was affirmed on appeal in Azam v. Jan, 2013 ABQB 301 at para 37. 
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As with the case of matrimonial causes in polygamous marriages, matrimonial 
proceedings involving same-sex couples terminate the familial relationship rather than 
create one. By petitioning for divorce or nullity of their marriage, the parties are not 
seeking recognition as a married couple. In essence, the court is not invited to legalize or 
endorse the same-sex marriage, but to discontinue and determine the void marriage. In 
Christiansen v. Christiansen,349 the Supreme Court of Wyoming in the United States 
considered a divorce petition resulting from a Canadian same-sex marriage. The district 
court had earlier ruled that the court cannot exercise jurisdiction over the petition because 
the Wyoming court had no subject-matter jurisdiction over the case (the State of 
Wyoming does not recognize same-sex marriage). Reversing the district court's dismissal 
of the divorce petition, and holding that the Wyoming court had jurisdiction over the 
case, the Supreme Court reasoned that 
recognizing a valid foreign same-sex marriage for the limited purpose 
of entertaining a divorce proceeding does not lessen the law or policy 
in Wyoming against allowing the creation of same-sex marriages. A 
divorce proceeding does not involve recognition of a marriage as an 
ongoing relationship. Indeed, accepting that a valid marriage exists 
plays no role except as a condition precedent to granting a divorce. 
After the condition precedent is met, the laws regarding divorce apply. 
Laws regarding marriage play no role.350 
 
The instructive reasoning behind the Supreme Court’s decision was that the law 
and policy of the State of Wyoming prohibiting the celebration and recognition of same-
sex marriage is not undermined or impaired where in a matrimonial proceeding involving 
same-sex couples, the parties only seek a dissolution of the marriage rather than 
enforcement or acceptance of the union. Christiansen provides insights for courts 
                                                 
349 (2011) 253 P.3d 153, 157. 
350Christiansen v. Christiansen (2011) 253 P.3d 153 at 156, reported in Judith M Stinson, “The Right to 
(Same-Sex) Divorce” (2011-2012) 62:2 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 447 at 464. 
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considering whether to exercise jurisdiction in matrimonial proceedings involving same-
sex marriage where the state prohibits such marriages.  A voidable marriage may be 
dissolved or declared a nullity without recognizing the marriage as valid, or, the court 
may recognize the marriage for the limited purpose of granting the matrimonial relief.351 
Neither approach requires the court to rule, or even opine upon the validity of the 
marriage before it.352 Byrn and Holcomb rightly note that in putative spouse cases, 
divorce and nullity are the available remedies to parties who have entered their marriage 
in good faith even though the marriage is technically void.353 In doing so, the court need 
not recognize the marriage as valid. This principle could be equally applied in 
matrimonial proceedings where a same-sex couple seeks nullity of his or her foreign 
marriage. Without this, the parties will be tied to a marriage which apparently does not 
exist.  
In sum, it is submitted that parties to a same-sex marriage should be entitled to 
commence matrimonial proceedings in any jurisdiction, provided the requirements for the 
court to accept jurisdiction are met. There seems to be no reason for refusing this relief in 
the case of a valid foreign same-sex marriage where the parties have satisfied the 
requirements for the court to exercise jurisdiction over them. The courts should have the 
ability to differentiate between cases which seek to establish the validity of the marriage, 
and those merely requesting matrimonial relief.  Exercising jurisdiction over same-sex 
marriages for the purposes of matrimonial relief does not necessarily imply the 
legitimization or condonation of the practice of same-sex relationships in those countries.  
                                                 
351 See generally  Barbara J. Cox, “Using an "Incidents of Marriage" Analysis When Considering Interstate 
Recognition of Same-Sex Couples' Marriages, Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships” (2004) 13 
Widener L.J. 699 at 729-746. 
352 See Byrn & Holcomb, supra 345 at 19. 





The foregoing discussion shows that same-sex relationships will likely be held 
violative of the laws in many English-speaking African countries. In Nigeria, Ghana and 
Kenya, the definition of marriage envisages a union between a man and a woman. There 
seems to be a great deal of hostility in African countries towards same-sex relationships. 
This is evident from the trend in anti-same-sex legislation in the region. The resentment 
and hostility is similar to the attitude toward polygamy and incestuous marriages in 
Canada and the UK.  Indeed, in Canada, polygamy is counted among barbarous acts, and 
the country has recently reaffirmed its resentment against polygamous unions by putting 
it under the Zero Tolerance for Barbaric Cultural Practices Act.354 Thus, aside the 
Criminal Code of Canada making polygamy a crime, the Zero Tolerance for Barbaric 
Cultural Practices Act, reinforces the hostility of Canada towards polygamy.  However, 
Canadian courts have, in conflict of laws situation, always dealt with marriages that are 
prohibited in the jurisdiction. The fact that unions, like polygamy, are not domestically 
recognized in Canada has not deterred or stopped the Canadian courts from exercising 
jurisdiction over such relationships where the parties satisfy the jurisdictional 
requirements for matrimonial causes.  
With the world gradually but surely moving towards accepting and 
institutionalizing same-sex relationships, African countries must be ready to deal with the 
conflict of law issues that may potentially arise from the recognition or non-recognition 
of these unions. As observed above, countries where same-sex marriages are explicitly 
prohibited may still be faced with having to deal with it in a conflict of laws context. 
                                                 
354S.C. 2015, c. 29. The Act received royal assent on 18th June, 2015, however, it is worth mentioning that 
it does not come into force until cabinet proclaims it. 
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Matrimonial proceedings and cases relating to the incidents of foreign same-sex 
marriages may still have to be litigated in some countries where there is blanket non-
recognition of this marriage.  Blanket non-recognition will, in some cases, not only lead 
to unfair results, but will be inconsistent with justice and equity. In general, African 
courts should be able to use the incidental approach to differentiate between cases which 
seek to legitimize the relationship in the country and those that merely seek to ask for 
incidental relief. This approach will remedy the harshness and injustice that a blanket 




































This thesis has assessed the cross-border legal questions posed by same-sex 
relationships in the context of the relevant regulatory/legislative regimes of English-
speaking African countries, specifically, Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya and South Africa. The 
thesis examined how the conflict of laws issues generated by unions which are not 
domestically recognized in the host state, and are explicitly prohibited in some 
jurisdictions, have been resolved. The discussion established that same-sex relationships 
will likely be held to violate the marriage laws of most African countries.355  In most 
African countries, there is a great deal of hostility, resentment and prejudice towards 
homosexual relationships, and this has resulted in the passing of statutes prohibiting 
homosexual acts, and reaffirming the "one man, one woman" marriage statutes.356  
Indeed, in countries such as Nigeria, Ghana and Kenya, same-sex relationships are either 
explicitly prohibited, or there is legislation which can be interpreted to prohibit such 
unions. 
 Domestic unions like polygamy, marriage between relatives, and Muslim 
marriages appear to be treated differently in each jurisdiction, and it is apparent that in 
Africa, these relationships would be recognized in another country if the essential and 
formal requirements of the marriage are satisfied. Invariably, the most important 
consideration is that the union is between opposite sexes. As well, notwithstanding the 
differences in each jurisdiction, these unions are common among the countries under 
                                                 
355 One significant aspect in the discussion of same-sex marriage in Africa is the moral disagreement over 
same-sex relationships and the question whether homosexuality is (or should be) an accepted practice. 
However, the subject is beyond the scope of this thesis and may form the basis of a future study. 
356 In Hyde v. Hyde, (1866) LR 1 P&D 130 marriage was considered the voluntary union for life of one 
man and one woman to the exclusion of all others. 
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study. But this is not the case in regard to same-sex marriage. Statutes such as the 
Nigeria’s Same-sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act explicitly provide that a same-sex 
marriage entered into between persons of the same gender in a foreign country shall be 
void in Nigeria, and any benefits accruing by virtue of the marriage shall not be enforced 
by any court of law in Nigeria.357 This rule of blanket non-recognition of foreign same-
sex unions means that even the incidents of such relationships would not be given any 
legal effect in the host country. 
Contrary to the position in most English-speaking African countries, there is 
growing inclination towards the recognition of same-sex relationships across the globe 
and this is likely to grow in the near future.358 This trend means that African states that do 
not domestically recognize same-sex relationships may, nevertheless, be confronted with 
them in one way or another in a conflict of laws context. Koppelman argues that if each 
state could confine same-sex relationships within its borders, so that, for instance, a 
same-sex marriage stays in the country where it was entered into, and other states do not 
have anything to do with such relationships, then no conflict of laws issues will arise.359 
However, it is virtually impossible for such a state of affairs to exist. The consequence of 
cross-border mobility, change of residency after marriage, inter-country adoption, and the 
fact that same-sex couples may own property outside the jurisdiction where the marriage 
was celebrated, are predominant. The cross-border issues are also exacerbated by the fact 
that the personal laws of the proposed same-sex couples, in some countries, are not given 
                                                 
357 Nigeria: Same-sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act, s 1. 
358 At present, there are 15 countries that allow same-sex marriage and two countries where same-sex 
marriage is legal in some jurisdictions (see Pew Research Religion and Public Life Project, (2013) Gay 
Marriage Around the World : <http://www.pewforum.org/2013/12/19/gay-marriage-around-the-world-
2013/>). 
359  Koppelman, supra not 201. 
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paramount consideration. Whether the parties can enter into a same-sex marriage under 
the applicable choice-of-law rule is seldom raised in the state of celebration of the 
marriage.360 In most cases, whether the intended marriage will be recognized outside of 
the place of celebration is not questioned before the celebration, and some legal systems 
disregard the national law of the spouse or the law of the state of their habitual 
residence.361It was noted that in Canada, for example, the fact that the laws of the place 
of domicile of an individual prohibit same-sex relationships, or whether a party to the 
marriage is a national of a country whose laws prohibit same-sex unions does not 
constitute a bar against the individuals seeking to celebrate their same-sex marriage in 
Canada. This means that individuals from countries where same-sex marriage is 
prohibited would be free to enter into such unions in Canada without recourse to their 
personal law.  From a conflict of laws perspective, the fact that domicile or nationality is 
not an essential requirement to the celebration of a same-sex marriage in some 
jurisdictions raises the question whether such a marriage will be recognized outside the 
country in which the union was entered into. 
The above reinforces the inevitable, that that even countries which do not 
domestically recognize same-sex relationships would have to find answers to the conflict 
of laws questions that such marriages would bring up for their consideration and 
adjudication. The possibility or reality of these cross-border issues means that laws which 
preclude giving "any legal effect" to same-sex relationships will, in some cases, lead to 
arbitrary and unjustifiable results.  
                                                 
360 See generally Daniele Gallo et el, eds Same-Sex Couples Before National, Supranational And 
International Jurisdictions(Berlin: Springer, 2013) at 359. 
361 Giacomo Biagioni, “On Recognition of Foreign Same-Sex Marriages and Partnerships” in Daniele Gallo 
et el (eds) Same-Sex Couples before National, Supranational and International Jurisdictions (Berlin: 
Springer, 2013) at 363. See also Art. 46(2) of the Belgian Code of Private International Law 
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The injustices which may occur in some situations where the strict non-
recognition is applied were addressed in Chapter Four. It was argued there that, first, in 
the case of inheritance, an adopted child may be refused the right to succession to his or 
her adopted same-sex parents’ property, notwithstanding that the parents considered 
him/her as their child during their lifetimes. Second, a same-sex spouse would not be able 
to inherit or succeed to the other spouse’s property in jurisdictions where a blanket rule of 
non-recognition exists, should the latter die intestate. In Nigeria, for example, this will be 
the position since the law does not recognize the legal effect of the marriage, and 
accordingly, the surviving spouse cannot establish his or her status as a spouse to benefit 
from the estate of the deceased.  Third, a same-sex couple who relocate to a jurisdiction 
which applies a blanket rule of non-recognition of same-sex unions, may enter into 
another marriage without recourse to the existing same-sex marriage, and the spouse 
under the same-sex marriage cannot enforce the existence of the union in the host 
country. This is so, since the host state does not recognize a marriage having ever existed 
between the putative husband and another person. Finally, same-sex couples seeking 
nullity or divorce of their marriage may be refused jurisdiction even where they have 
satisfied the requirements for the court to exercise jurisdiction over them. These 
situations are all apparent where the courts refuse to give any legal effect to a foreign 
same-sex union. 
 The absurd results and injustice consequent to the application of the rule non-
recognition also existed in jurisdictions like Canada and the UK when their courts refused 
to recognize certain domestic unions such as polygamy. The discussion in chapter 3 
evidences this. But it also establishes that both Canada and the UK later departed from 
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not according any legal effect to domestic unions like polygamy, and began to assume 
jurisdiction for purposes of curing the mischief and injustices occasioned by non-
recognition. The UK and Canadian courts chose to distinguish between cases which seek 
to legitimize the union, from those which seek incidental relief. This way, they were able 
to give effect to the consequences of a marriage that is not otherwise domestically 
recognized in the two jurisdictions without legitimizing them. They have reasoned that 
exercising jurisdiction over such prohibited unions does not infringe their public policies 
which do not recognize the unions. Indeed, the fact that the marriage took place in 
another country is part of the reason why public policy does not intervene.362 
Koppelmen, says that unions that are not domestically recognized in these states 
by reason of their public policies– such as interracial marriage, incest and polygamy – 
have, nevertheless, been given limited recognition for the purpose of proceedings to 
enforce incidents flowing from them without legitimizing them. He argues that a similar 
approach is the best way to find a truce in the war over same-sex marriage.363 Although 
Koppelmen deals with the recognition of same-sex marriage in the US, his account of the 
situation and the solution he offers fits into the context of Africa.364This approach, 
                                                 
362 See Martha Bailey et el, “Expanding Recognition of Foreign Polygamous Marriages: Policy 
Implications for Canada” (2008-2009) 25 Nat'l J. Const. L. 83 at 92. 
363 See in general, Koppelman, supra note 201. 
364It is worth mentioning that Koppelman’s account of same-sex marriage reflects the previous position in 
the US where same-sex marriage was illegal and prohibited in certain states.  However, it has been reported 
that since June 2013, in United States v. Windsor (2013) 133 S.Ct. 2675 when the Supreme Court struck 
down as unconstitutional Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), federal and state courts have 
issued 56 rulings striking down as unconstitutional, state prohibitions of same-sex marriages in 26 states. 
By the end of 2014, 35 states and the District of Columbia had legalized same-sex marriages ( Symeonides, 
supra note 215 at 69-71).  
At present, the Supreme Court has ruled that marriage is a constitutional right for all. See   
Obergefellet al. v. Hodges, Director, Ohio Department of Health, et al(26 June 2015) 14/556 (Supreme 
Court of the United States), online: <http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/14-556_3204.pdf>. 
The decision means that a man or woman can marry same-sex in all state when hitherto happened in just 35 
states in the US. From a conflict of laws perspective same-sex couples from jurisdictions where same-sex 
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together with aspects of the Canadian and UK regimes which effectively recognise 
domestic unions otherwise prohibited in the two jurisdictions, offer some lessons for 
English-speaking African countries that may choose to adapt them. 
The next section looks at some lessons that English-speaking African countries 
may learn from Canada and the UK to deal with the cross-border issues that may arise 
from same-sex marriages. 
 
2. Lessons for English-speaking Africa from Canada and the UK 
 
Canada and the UK have been able to effectively resolve the conflict of laws 
issues which arise from foreign unions that are domestically prohibited in the two 
jurisdictions. In both countries, this has been done through legislation and judicial 
intervention. Until recently, most family law legislation in Africa viewed marriage from a 
heterosexual perspective, and gave little to no attention to the recognition of same-sex 
marriage. Chapter four demonstrated that recent legislation on the subject portrays a 
movement towards entirely prohibiting same-sex relationships in most jurisdictions, with 
little to no attention to the cross-border issues arising from such unions. At present, it is 
not clear how African courts will deal with the cross-border issues that may arise from 
the recognition/non-recognition of same-sex marriage. The absence of judicial decisions 
in Africa on this makes it a challenge to predict what a court will do when faced with the 
conflict of laws aspects of same-sex marriage.   
African courts can learn from Canada and the UK. However, specific conditions, 
such as theirpolitical, geographical, cultural and social context, require that they 
                                                                                                                                                 
marriage has been celebrated will now have their union recognised when they move from the state where 
the marriage was performed to another state. 
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contemplate solutions that may not be found in Canada and the UK. From the analysis, 
however, it is suggested that the following lessons be adopted by English-speaking 
African countries for their private international law approaches to cases involving same-
sex relationships celebrated abroad. 
First, African courts should have the authority to entertain same-sex marriages 
where the parties satisfy the requirements for the court to assume jurisdiction. In general, 
persons who want to know whether they are married or single should be given broad 
access to the courts to get an answer.365As discussed, for instance, under Ontario’s Rules 
of Civil Procedure,366 a party seeking a declaration of nullity of his/her marriage need not 
show affiliation between the forum and the facts giving rise to the cause of action, 
although in practice, one of the parties may be connected to the forum court by reason of 
one or more of the grounds required for the court to exercise jurisdiction over the 
parties.367 In the context of same-sex marriage, and with specific reference to English-
speaking African countries, this example means that the fact that the same-sex union was 
entered into in another jurisdiction is not enough consideration for the court to refuse 
jurisdiction. Essentially, that one of the parties is connected to the forum court is enough 
ground for the court to exercise jurisdiction. 
Second, the courts should use the incident approach to differentiate between cases 
where the parties seek adversarial court procedures, such as those dividing marital 
property, from those which seek to legitimize the union. Marriage creates different rights. 
In dealing with the subject matter, the court should take into account the context of each 
                                                 
365 In a different but related context see Vaughan Black, “Choice of Law and Territorial Jurisdiction of 
Courts in Family Matters” (2013) 32:1 C.F.L.Q 53 at 68. 




case. Where the parties solely seek matrimonial relief, recognition of same-sex marriage 
for this adversarial procedure would not imply endorsement of the union or behaviors 
associated with the practice.  
In countries where same-sex marriage is domestically recognized, the following 
lessons could be legislated for application. First, authorities should not celebrate a same-
sex marriage between two persons if the personal law of one (or both) do not allow same-
sex marriage. This will limit the limping marriage phenomenon, where a marriage that is 
valid under one law would not be recognized in another jurisdiction. This position is 
reflected by Belgium where only couples from countries with the freedom to enter into a 
same-sex marriage under their personal law can be married under Belgian law.368 In 
countries where same-sex marriage is legal, citizens of other countries who are residents 
in those jurisdictions should not be allowed to enter into a same-sex marriage without 
recourse to the law of the country of their nationality or domicile.369 
Related to the above is that states which perform same-sex marriages should 
provide a forum for matrimonial actions arising from such marriages. In Canada, and in 
states such as California, Delaware, Illinois, and Oregon, legislation allows couples who 
celebrate their same-sex marriage in these jurisdictions to dissolve them in that state, 
even if the only connecting factor to the jurisdiction is that it is the place of marriage.370 
As the court rightly noted in V & L v. Attorney General of Canada, a country that allows 
                                                 
368See Aude Fiorini, “New Belgium Law on Same-sex Marriage and Its Pil Implications” (2003) 52 Int'l & 
Comp. L.Q. 1039 at 1047. 
369 See O. A Odiase-Alegimenlen & Jacob O. Garuba, “Same-sex Marriage: Nigeria at the Middle of 
Western Politics” (2014) 3:1 Oromia Law Journal 260 at 288. 
370 See Nick Tarasen, “Untangling the Knot: Finding a Forum for Same-Sex Divorces in the State of 
Celebration” (2011) 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1585 at 1603. 
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foreigners to celebrate their same-sex marriage in the jurisdiction cannot later claim to 
have no responsibility to them.371 
 
 
3. Final Remarks 
 
The discussion of the conflict of laws issues that may arise from the non-
recognition of same-sex marriage in selected English-speaking African countries has 
shown that the strict application of the rule of non-recognition, where the court gives no 
legal effect to a foreign same-sex union, is unworkable and leads to arbitrary and unfair 
results. It is admitted that the recommendations offered to deal with this problems may 
not be fool-proof. However, it is possible that their application will enable English-
speaking African countries to effectively begin to come to terms with the cross-border 
issues that may arise from same-sex relationships whose incidents find presence or 
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